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THE SOVIET UNION, 1966

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CURRENT History

OCTOBER, 1966

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In this study of the current situation in the Soviet Union, six articles explore the foreign and the domestic policies of Soviet leaders today. Analyzing Soviet policies toward the nations of the West, our introductory author points out the current Russian emphasis on Europe. "It is in Europe that the Soviet most fears hostile coalitions and it is there that [it] seeks a detente with the forces of status quo and a position . . . in its councils. . . ."

The U.S.S.R. and the West

By DAVID T. CATTELL

Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles

THE SWING of the pendulum from the antics of Nikita Khrushchev to the cautious policies of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin have entailed not only a rejection of Khrushchev but a reversal of both internal and external policies to a period prior to World War II. This return to the past seems to be particularly marked in the area of foreign policy. On the one hand, in its competition with Communist China the Soviet Union is trying to stress the orthodoxy of its Leninist revolutionary doctrine. Brezhnev's report to the 23d party congress on March 29, 1966, typified this attitude. His analysis of the contradictions of capitalism leading inevitably to its collapse was strictly

traditional and could have been written 20 or 30 years ago—except that it omitted the inevitability of these contradictions developing into imperialist wars. He completely ignored the whole revisionist tendency among European Communist parties and among certain writers in the Soviet Union who have come to recognize the new and improved vitality of the West.¹

On the other hand, the new leadership sees the essence of its foreign policy to be defensive, reminiscent of the "popular front" days of the 1930's. It is, therefore, not surprising that the thirtieth anniversary of the seventh congress of the Comintern in 1935, at which the popular front strategy was proclaimed, was given special attention by the Communists. The Soviet leaders seem to consider themselves essentially in the same position as they were in the 1930's but with some additional complications. As before, they find themselves faced with powerful opponents both in the East and in the West. Of the two, they find Germany—this time backed by

¹ For example see A. Milakovskiy, "In search of a way out; state monopoly capitalism in the 1960's," *Izvestia*, March 13, 1966.

² It can be argued that the current danger in the West is not comparable to Nazi Germany even in the minds of Soviet leaders. This may be true but the overwhelming growth of West Europe and the United States in recent years represents a power potential much greater than that of Nazi Germany and for the Soviet leaders the symbol of this potential threat is West Germany.

the United States—the most powerful; certainly the Soviet Union has little chance of matching the strength of this "Western" alliance in the near future.² The complicating factors of today are (1) that the Soviets' "Eastern" opponent, China, is competing for control of the international revolutionary movement of the left while, at the same time, (2) this movement is falling apart into national units. Further, as in the 1930's, the Soviet Union needs a period of international tranquility to solve various internal economic problems.

The strategy of the Soviet leaders in dealing with these enemies is also similar to that of the 1930's; in effect the current doctrine of peaceful coexistence is the popular front with a few modifications. The basic contradiction of simultaneously trying to keep alive the myth of revolutionary leadership while seeking alliances with the forces of the status quo creates the same ambivalence encountered in the 1930's and leads to almost the same self-defeating policies and results. Today, however, the dilemma is even more acute because of the continuous propaganda attacks by Communist China with its own dynamic revolutionary appeal.

FOREIGN POLICY FACETS

Following the earlier pattern several facets of Soviet foreign policy seem to be emerging. (1) The Soviet Union, itself, avoids all provocative or adventurist policies, taking advantage of situations only as they develop while, in its propaganda, it places increasing emphasis on the "inevitable laws of history." (2) The Soviet Union is reducing its commitment in all areas other than those contiguous to the Soviet Union and directly related to its defense. (3) Friendship treaties and alliances are being sought from border countries whose governments support peace and the status quo. (4) The Soviet Union, on the one hand, is attempting to isolate China by strengthening relations with Japan, the Mongolian Peoples' Republic and North Vietnam, but, on the other hand, is trying to keep the

² Soviet influence in Algeria has been at least partially restored and Soviet economic and military aid to that country has continued.

conflict with China in limbo by avoiding further polemics and provocative acts. In fact, the Soviet leaders continuously offer renewed friendship and alliance to China. (5) The Soviet Union seeks the destruction by one or another method of all hostile or potentially hostile alliances. (6) The main thrust of Soviet policy is directed toward Europe in an effort to build an alliance against potential aggressors, East or West. (7) The Communist parties are urged to unite with other labor and leftist forces to create governments friendly to the Soviet Union and to the international status quo.

THE "THIRD WORLD"

In competition with China, Soviet propaganda places support for the down-trodden masses of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the central focus of Soviet foreign relations, but, in practice, not since the early 1960's has the underdeveloped world held top priority. In fact, the events of the last two years have pushed it even further into the background. The ouster of the pro-Communist group in Kenya and the rapid succession of military coups against "friendly, anti-imperialist" governments, beginning with Algeria³, followed by Indonesia, Ghana and the threatened coups in Mali and the Congo (Brazzaville), seem to be bringing the Soviet African and Southeast Asian adventures to a close. The Soviet leaders now seem to be confining such interest to maintaining a foothold in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt as a basis for bargaining against China and the West, much as they used Spain in the 1930's. But even in Egypt the rumblings of a possible dethronement of Nasser have made the Russians wary and Brezhnev's visit to Egypt in May was seemingly for the purpose of strengthening both Nasser and Soviet influence. Brezhnev apparently also took the occasion to urge Nasser to be cautious and to maintain relations with the West, in order not to lose valuable economic benefits. The Soviet Union views the new leftist Syrian government which came to power in February, 1966, and the growing anti-British political movement in South Arabia as situations to be taken

advantage of, but from the cautious nature of its responses it is clear that the U.S.S.R. holds out little trust for the stability of Communist influence in the unstable Middle East.

The Cyprus crisis proved such a lesson. Last year, in an attempt to restore better relations with Turkey, the Soviet Union suggested federation as a solution to the communal conflict on Cyprus and as a result lost the position of influence among the Greek Cypriots which it had gained by sending equipment to President Makarios. Even the Communist Party of Cyprus, A.K.E.L., denounced the Soviet Union for its stand.⁴ Fence sitting in the Middle East is a particularly hazardous feat, as the Soviets have learned.

The Latin American situation has not been any more encouraging from the Soviet standpoint. Cuba remains an expensive folly and the Dominican crisis which began so promisingly as a means of discrediting the United States is gradually being resolved. The other revolutionary movements in Latin America are languishing and there are serious problems in the maintenance of any kind of unity among Latin American Communist parties.

The general Soviet disappointment in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia has been confirmed by further cuts in its economic aid. But, in contrast, Soviet interest in the small and middle powers along its borders has greatly increased in the last year. The Soviet leaders have been busy exchanging delegations, signing communiques of friendship and concluding economic and cultural exchange agreements with Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Japan, Afghanistan and Finland. The Soviet leaders even gambled their prestige on mediating the war between India and Pakistan. Likewise, they have made major efforts to settle their differences with Rumania and renew the vitality of the Eastern bloc.

EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

For over 200 years Europe has been the

⁴ T. W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell, "Communism in Cyprus," *Problems of Communism*, XV, 3 (May-June, 1966), 22-30.

source of Russia's most powerful allies and enemies alike and today is no exception. It is in Europe that the Soviet most fears hostile coalitions and it is there that the Soviet Union seeks a detente with the forces of status quo and a position for the Soviet Union in its councils—with the power of veto. Hegemony over Western Europe exists only as a pipe dream. In spite of the Soviet Union's greater power in the 1960's, such a possibility is more remote than ever. The growing independence and national outlook of Communist parties even within Russia's military sphere suggest that even an electoral victory by West European Communists would not mean Soviet control.

In seeking entrance into the councils of Europe the current leaders are not trying to force their way as Khrushchev did but are waiting for advantageous political situations to develop. Thus, for example, pressure on West Berlin has been minimal involving an occasional harassment of the air corridors, the moving of the wall to inconvenience West Berliners, or a propaganda barrage.

The revival of Nazism and the fear of West German revanchism is the central thesis of Soviet propaganda. Invariably, every issue of every periodical dealing with foreign relations has an article about some aspect of the growing German threat and the need for a renewal of a democratic front against the revival of Nazism. The goals are to secure recognition for the indefinite division of Germany and to prevent West Germany from becoming directly or indirectly a part of the nuclear club. This is the primary reason behind the persistent Soviet pressure for a treaty against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and its refusal to consider the United States draft treaty which does not insure against nuclear weapons coming under West German control. The Soviet leaders also seek to revive the 1930's idea of an "Eastern" Locarno agreement, one guaranteeing the borders of East Europe, but have expanded it to include recognition for the permanent division of Germany and the creation of a nuclear free zone in central Europe.

Soviet apprehensions about a new Nazi

threat are in large part genuine, based on a fear of West German development backed by the United States and memories of the past. However, it is also a convenient rallying issue for other goals. The use of an external threat for mobilizing the population has always been standard propaganda technique and, since the Soviet population has remained indifferent to the war in Vietnam in spite of the hue and cry of the Soviet propaganda machine, the fear of German revanchism is a useful propaganda vehicle and still elicits the proper response. The German menace is also used in East Europe in an effort to keep the Eastern bloc from further deterioration. Finally it takes advantage of the hostility of many West Europeans who fear the growing strength of Bonn and its dominating role in "little Europe."

The Soviet Union seems aware that its hostility toward West Germany might hasten a United States-German alliance and has not precluded all contacts. Brezhnev at the 13th congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia declared,

While vigorously rebuffing the dangerous policy of revanchism, we are at the same time in favor of the FRG's participation in peaceful cooperation among European parties, which will aid the strengthening of security in Europe.⁵

The Soviet Union also encouraged the expansion of contacts and debates between the West German Social Democratic Party and the East German Socialist Unity Party,⁶ scheduled for July, 1966 (but never held), until it became clear that they would turn into a propaganda "slugging match."

THE U.S.S.R. AND DE GAULLE

From the beginning the Soviet Union has sought the destruction of NATO and, as an alternative, Soviet leaders since Stalin have proposed an all-European security system in which the Soviet could play a major role. Antecedents for this proposal go back to the proposed alliances against Nazi Germany in the popular front days. French President

⁵ Pravda, June 1, 1966.

⁶ See "Dialogue can be useful," *Izvestia*, May 22, 1966, and "Ripe conditions," *ibid.*, June 15, 1966.

Charles de Gaulle currently seems to want to deliver both of these Soviet objectives gratis. Consequently, de Gaulle's visit to the U.S.S.R. in June, 1966, should have marked a great Russian diplomatic triumph. But Soviet propaganda before and after the visit claimed no such victory. During the visit it was clear that de Gaulle dominated the discussions and that Soviet interests played a subordinate role. The Soviet commentaries even seemed to hint that the precipitous action of de Gaulle in withdrawing his troops from NATO might bring about the nuclear armament of West Germany by the United States to fill the vacuum in NATO left by France, particularly at a time when the United States is so deeply committed in Southeast Asia.

But Soviet suspicions about de Gaulle go even deeper. De Gaulle has a history of anticomunism and betrayal. Even more important for the future, many of his followers are "Red baiters," who, if they were to take over, very likely would abruptly turn against the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviets have consistently pictured de Gaulle as a representative of the most calculating French monopolists, but a leader, nevertheless, who has some useful approaches to foreign policy. He is, they claim, not motivated by pro-socialist or humanitarian attitudes but by a desire to put French monopolists ahead of their competitors in West Germany and the United States. Finally, the Soviet Union cannot ignore the bitter struggle between de Gaulle and the Communist Party in France. The French Communist Party is not only one of the two largest West European Communist parties but the most loyal to the Soviet Union. In this crucial period when the Soviet Union is trying to maintain some control over international communism, it cannot afford to undermine its most important ally outside the bloc. Thus, the Soviet Union is making no secret of the fact that it is treating the de Gaulle affair with scepticism and caution.

THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN

As the Soviet leaders see Europe it is only by eliminating or reducing the influence of

the United States that they can hope to play a major role in European politics. Furthermore, the Soviet Union does not trust the seeming simple-mindedness of the United States in restoring and advancing the cause of West German imperialism. Playing on this fear of a United States-German alliance and the growing penetration of American capital in Europe, Soviet propaganda continuously presses for a reduction of the American presence in Europe.⁷ More recently Soviet tacticians have used the unpopularity of the Dominican crisis and the Vietnamese war to try to turn West Europe against the United States. They have also supported de Gaulle in trying to undermine the dollar and the pound sterling as the international medium of exchange, stressing in their articles the declining gold reserves behind both currencies.

In proposing their all-European security scheme the Soviet commentaries usually do not mention the participation of the United States but do not exclude the possibility.⁸ They do, however, demand the removal of American bases in Europe as a precondition

⁷ Soviet propaganda, for example, made extensive use of the loss of a hydrogen bomb in the crash during refueling of a United States bomber over Spain in January, 1966.

⁸ For example, the communiqus of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact in July, 1966, made no mention of the United States taking part in the discussion of an all-European security system but a Soviet editorial in *International Affairs* (Moscow), 6 (June, 1966), 4, stated, "Questions of European security may be discussed either with or without the participation of the United States."

⁹ After several months delay the United States-Russian cultural agreement was signed on March 19, 1966.

¹⁰ "In the past, regardless of whether the government was headed by the Labour Prime Minister Attlee or the Conservative leaders Churchill and Eden, in certain cases they put pressure on their American partners when they concluded that Washington's line contradicted Britain's interests. It is impossible to imagine that the present Pentagon policy of escalating aggression corresponds in any degree whatsoever to the interest of the British people. If the Labour Government would use its opportunities, which its leaders from time to time declare it has, for influencing its ally, this might lead to positive results. Unfortunately, there are no signs that London intends to take such a step. In reply to the questions of the journalists who met him in London, Prime Minister Wilson stated that there is no hope in the immediate future for any British initiative on the Vietnam question. . . ." (*Pravda*, February 27, 1966).

for any all-European security treaty. Supplementary to the European security system the Soviet bloc countries have proposed nuclear free zones in central and northern Europe and in the Mediterranean. When these various security proposals were originally advanced in the 1950's, they were dismissed by the West as pure propaganda; but the status quo policy of the Soviet Union in Europe, except for Berlin, and West European prosperity have created a sentiment in the West for exploring these proposals. And many Europeans who do not generally support de Gaulle applaud his initiative in this direction.

To establish the proper atmosphere for a detente the Soviet Union has assiduously been expanding cultural, trade and political exchanges with the West, but not uniformly. On the one hand, cultural exchanges have continued with the United States in spite of the Vietnam war and strained political relations.⁹ On the other hand, the Soviet Union excludes West Germany from its exchanges although several East European countries have been expanding their trade with Bonn. At the same time, the Soviet Union has made little effort in the last year to woo Great Britain and their relationship has cooled. There seem to be several reasons for this change in attitude. Great Britain along with West Germany resists the isolation of the United States and in the main supports the war in Vietnam. Secondly, the general prestige of Great Britain has declined because of its unsolved economic problems; but even more important is the Communist view that Harold Wilson's Labour government, in its handling of the problems, is betraying the cause of the working class. Thirdly, Great Britain is still a major enemy in Communist anticolonial propaganda. Finally, Great Britain represents, as co-chairman of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, a negotiated peace for Vietnam and, until the Soviet Union is willing to force a negotiated peace on President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, the British can expect the same cool treatment Wilson received on his visits to Moscow in February and July of 1966.¹⁰

As the continued attacks on British and

Western imperialism in the developing areas suggest, the attempt to create a security alliance with West Europe is only one side of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and like its predecessor, the popular front, its sincerity is suspect. Brezhnev in his report to the 23d party congress could not have stated the contradictions more baldly:

The Soviet Union firmly stands for non-interference in the international affairs of all states, for respect for their sovereign rights and the inviolability of their territories.

Naturally, there can be no peaceful coexistence when it comes to internal processes of the class and national-liberation struggle in the capitalist countries or in the colonies. The principle of peaceful coexistence is not applicable to the relations between the oppressors and the oppressed, between the colonialists and the victims of colonial oppressions.

As for interstate relations with the capitalist countries, we hold that such relations not only should be peaceful but should also include the broadest possible mutual advantageous economic, scientific and cultural ties.

Thus while trying to ally themselves with the forces of status quo in Europe the Communists reserve for themselves the right to work for the overthrow of these same forces both in the developing countries and in Europe. This conflict of interest has been particularly noticeable in two areas, the United Nations and the Communist parties of Western Europe.

THE UNITED NATIONS

From 1945 on the Soviet Union has feared the United Nations as a potential coalition against itself and has sought to destroy it as an effective security organ. Even with the shift of the voting balance in the General Assembly in recent years the Soviet Union still seeks its neutralization as a security system but at the same time takes advantage of it to mobilize Asian, African and Latin American public opinion against the West. Recently

the Soviet Union has succeeded as never before. The election of U Thant as Secretary-General in 1961 was the first step. He was acceptable to the Soviet Union because he seemed to lack the dynamism and the determination to act independently and decisively.

In 1965, when America backed down to the U.S.S.R. and France on the financial issue, to all intents and purposes the power of the General Assembly to use security forces for the maintenance of peace was canceled. As a result the Western powers and even the Soviet Union itself, as the Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan indicates, have ceased to look to the United Nations to maintain the peace. In addition the radical, uncompromising resolutions and demands of the majority of the Afro-Asian bloc, enthusiastically encouraged by the Soviet bloc during the past year, have further discredited the usefulness of the United Nations in the eyes of the West. Against this background it will be difficult for the Soviet Union to convince the West that its proposed all-European system has the objective of reconciliation and compromise and not division.

THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE

Since the death of Joseph Stalin and the destruction of monolithic communism, the Communist parties of Western Europe have one by one in the face of overwhelming West European prosperity come to accept the vitality of capitalism and its success in avoiding major depressions.¹¹ While they still cry out against the evils of monopoly capitalism, they accept and encourage the growth of state capitalism as a progressive step.¹² Consequently they increasingly argue that the only way to share or gain power is to accept the rules of the parliamentary game and to unite with the socialists and other leftist groups for an electoral victory. The Italian Communist Party has gone the furthest in abandoning the trappings of a revolutionary movement in its efforts to achieve legitimacy as a democratic political party. Surrounded by a predominantly Catholic population, party leader

¹¹ See the discussions in "Western Europe: trends in modern capitalism," *World Marxist Review*, VIII, 11 (November, 1965).

¹² The Austrian Communists at the 19th congress of their party even agreed to accept the sharing of management by the workers as an important step on the peaceful road to socialism. See *World Marxist Review*, IX, 1 (January, 1966), 82.

Palmiro Togliatti for many years recognized the need for contacts with the Church. The recent liberalizing reforms of the Church hierarchy have made it possible to open up informal dialogue between the Communist and Catholic intellectuals.¹³ The Italian Communists also stress recognition of the Common Market and the need to reorganize the West European Communist movement accordingly.

The French Communist Party is slowly moving in the same direction but resists such a rapid overthrow of orthodoxy and of the tutelage of the Soviet Union and suspects the ambitions of the Italian Communists. Also, the French Communists are reluctant to engage in any dialogues which they fear would hinder joint action with other left groups.¹⁴ It is not surprising, therefore, that the results of the conference of West European Communist parties in Austria in May, 1966, to plan joint action were modest and accepted cooperation only in principle. Likewise, the agreement between the French and Italian Communists on the handling of Italian migrant workers in France is also limited.

FLEXIBLE COEXISTENCE

While the policy of peaceful coexistence is sufficiently flexible and vague to encompass the revisions of even the Italian Communists, the Soviet leaders are careful not to endorse revisionism, because they must compete against the revolutionary dynamism of Communist China and must follow a line which appeals not only to European communism but also to the more orthodox and revolutionary tendencies of Communists in the underdeveloped world. Furthermore, parlia-

¹³ For a more detailed discussion, see Kevin Devlin, "The Catholic-Communist 'dialogue,'" *Problems of Communism*, XV, 3 (May-June, 1966), 31-38.

¹⁴ "The Communist Party [of France] holds that ideological discussions should not be allowed to retard joint action nor hamper the conclusion of an agreement on a common government programme," [as quoted from René Andrieu, Editor-in-Chief of *L'Humanité*, in "Our Prospects," reprinted in *New Times*, 18 (May 1, 1966), 4].

¹⁵ Treatment of the Catholic Church in Soviet periodicals is also much less hostile than previously. See Juliusz Stroynowski, "The Catholic Church in the 'third world,'" *New Times*, 35 (September 1, 1965) 10-14.

tary democracy is a doctrine which the Soviet leaders, themselves, cannot accept. Occasionally the Soviet Union will lend the revisionists some support. For example, the private audience of the Soviet foreign minister with Pope Paul VI in April, 1966, seemed to give some sanction to the dialogue of Communists and Catholics, although in fact the purpose of the audience was to associate the Soviet Union with the Pope's pleas for peace in Vietnam.¹⁵ The Soviet Union, however, finds it impossible to agree to any endorsement of the Common Market which is both an economic and a political threat to itself.

The unexpectedly large vote for Gaston Defferre, the Socialist candidate opposed to de Gaulle and backed by a united front of Communists, Socialists and Radical Socialists in the French presidential elections of December, 1965, was hailed by the Soviet Union and European Communists as a major victory and proof of the value of a united front. But except for this one episode and a few restricted dialogues, the European socialists and Christian democrats in the main have remained cool to any alliance. For example, the Italian socialists under Pietro Nenni, in spite of certain embarrassments rising from association with an ineffectual left-center coalition, have evidenced no disposition to renew their alliance with the Communists. The Socialist International meeting in Sweden in May, 1966, also showed little sentiment for a general united front with the Communists. Suspicion of the popular front days still remains, the growing autonomy of the Com-

(Continued on page 240)

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"No matter how independent the East European Communists may seem to be from time to time," notes this author, "they are still linked to one another, and to Moscow, by commitment both to the values and to most, if not all, the techniques of Marxism-Leninism." It is also apparent, as he sees it, "that the Soviet Union's need for close and harmonious relations with East Europe is very great indeed."

Soviet Relations with East Europe

By STEPHEN S. ANDERSON
Faculty Member, Marlboro College

IN STALIN'S TIME it was relatively easy to characterize Soviet relations with Eastern Europe: they were essentially imperial, with each satellite nation governed by a party leadership responsible ultimately to Joseph Stalin himself. The one deviator from this pattern, Yugoslavia, was expelled from the system in 1948, thus emphasizing and preserving the monolithic character of the empire.

The analyst attempting to describe the contemporary situation, nearly a decade and a half after Stalin's death, faces a far more complex task. There is no longer any empire in the Stalinist sense of the word. To describe the East European states as satellites of the U.S.S.R. is at the very least misleading, if not inaccurate. Even the self-proclaimed "solidarity" between the Soviet Union and the various countries of Eastern Europe is in many cases illusory.

This is not to say that the Soviet Union has only slight influence in the area. It remains unquestionably the most powerful external force operating there, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Perhaps it would be most accurate to view the present relationship in diplomatic terms: the Soviet Union is in a continual state of negotiation with Eastern Europe. It negotiates from a position of great strength, but nonetheless—for reasons this article will endeavor to make

clear—it must frequently accept compromises, and nowhere is it in a position simply to issue orders, to make general policy by fiat.

The present situation did not, of course, develop overnight. It is rather the result of long-term trends whose roots go back to the Stalinist period. While the immediate consequence of the penetration of Soviet influence into Eastern Europe at the end of World War II was indeed the establishment of satellite regimes, it was also profoundly revolutionary.

First, it created effective and unified central governments in nations most of which had known only political disunity or even chaos during previous decades. Second, it vastly accelerated a process of industrialization and social change which had developed only feebly in the interwar period. Third, and perhaps most important, it created a new political elite, drawn from the most ambitious and—it must be added—the most ruthless elements in each of the East European societies.

Stalin's method of controlling the forces set in motion by his revolutionary policies was essentially personal. It rested heavily upon the general acceptance, among the newly-installed East European leaderships, of the mystique of his own omniscience. This was of course supplemented by Soviet secret police penetration of the new regimes and in some (but not all) cases by Soviet military presence.

Still, the personal element seems to have been most important. Significantly, Stalin created no really effective institutions for ordering the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), set up in 1947 to provide a channel of intraparty communication, played no significant role after its one major act, the expulsion of the Yugoslav heretics in 1948. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA) was formed in 1949; but as an essentially propagandistic counter to the Marshall Plan, its integrative function was negligible under Stalin.

Stalin's death thus removed the mainstay of the structure of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and his successors, both before and after Premier Nikita Khrushchev, have been searching ever since for effective ways of coping with a rising tide of self-assertiveness among the East European nations and, particularly, among their leaderships. The most serious problems in this regard have been encountered in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Albania in the early 1960's, and in Rumania in the mid-1960's. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany (the last not really a nation, in the modern sense) have on the whole been more quiescent. Yugoslavia has played a special role, providing a continuing example of a moderate socialist state refusing to accept full association with the Soviet-East European system, but willing to cooperate closely with it, on Yugoslav terms.

APPROACHES

To summarize a great deal of very complex history, the post-Stalin Soviet leaderships have attempted to develop the organizational cohesion that Stalin neglected along three main lines: political, economic and military. Of special significance is the fact that the broad approaches developed by Khrushchev in the 1950's have not been abandoned or replaced by his successors, despite the fact that his removal in October, 1964, was in part the result of deteriorating Soviet-East European relations. There do not seem to be any alternatives open to Soviet policy.

Of the three main lines just mentioned,

political organization has been the most amorphous. As noted, the Cominform was allowed to languish under Stalin. In the tension-filled early post-Stalin years, no effort was made to revive it, and it was in fact abolished in the spring of 1956, in the wake of Khrushchev's ill-fated effort (which culminated in the Hungarian Revolution that fall) to achieve cohesion through ideological consensus rather than institutional unity. Although in the aftermath of the Hungarian experience, the utility of an intraparty consultative organ was pointed out by the Russians, there has never been enough support from the East European leaderships to realize the project. The Poles, and later the Rumanians, vehemently opposed any such organization as reminiscent of Stalinist centralism. Naturally, there *has* been political consultation, a great deal of it, in fact; but for the most part it has been bilateral, or, when multilateral, it has been carried out in conjunction with the Communist Party congresses which are held from time to time in the U.S.S.R. and East Europe.

A recent example of this was the 23d party congress in March, 1966, at which extended Soviet-East European talks on the Warsaw Pact and Sino-Soviet relations were apparently held. Such consultations, however, have generally been of a rather ad hoc and indecisive character and Soviet efforts to use them as a means of hammering out—and enforcing—a general line have not been notably successful. The fact is that there exists no formally-constituted body in which multilateral Soviet-East European political consultation and decision-making can regularly occur. This seems to be the preference of the East Europeans.

Economic organization is certainly far more developed. One of the first steps taken by the post-Stalin leadership vis-à-vis East Europe was the reactivation of the long-inactive CEMA structure, proposing for CEMA a much larger role in the coordination and integration of the Soviet and East European economies. Such a trend could contribute importantly to more stable Soviet influence in the region. Much useful work

was done: by the early 1960's, rudimentary coordination of national economic plans was under way, a CEMA-sponsored oil and electricity distribution system was under construction, a multilateral payment system was being devised, and specialized standing committees were working in the various capitals to promote the overall development of the different economic structures throughout the CEMA area.

The time apparently seemed ripe to the Soviet leadership to press for still closer integration, and in 1962, with the backing of the most-highly industrialized East European countries, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, it proposed a new supranational authority with powers to allocate resources and adjust national economic plans within CEMA. Unexpected resistance to this plan came from Rumania, which flatly refused to accept such supranational authority over its economy, and then went on to defy the Soviet Union on a number of other international issues, such as China and East-West trade. While by no means disastrous for CEMA's role as promoter of intrabloc trade, the Rumanian action did serve to arrest any movement toward Soviet-dominated supranationalism within the organization.

Since 1963, CEMA has focused on reforms designed to increase trade, such as the establishment of a multilateral payment bank (1964) and an overhaul of the obsolete system of bloc prices (begun in late 1965 and still under way). Indicative of the Soviet role in CEMA was a complaint, voiced by a Soviet economist in the spring of 1966¹, that the U.S.S.R. was not receiving fair prices for the industrial raw materials it had been supplying East Europe over the years. This sounded very much like the preliminary, not to some arbitrary and unilateral Soviet action, but rather to a round of hard bargaining over "fairer" prices. CEMA functions, and it surely helps to solidify Soviet-East European relations, but it is a two-way body and

not an instrument of Soviet dictation.

The third organizational approach attempted by the Soviet Union is military in character and involves what is known as the Warsaw Pact. This is a multilateral defense agreement made in 1955 in response to West German rearment and inclusion in NATO. The pact supplemented existing bilateral agreements and initially did little more than give legal justification for the continued stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, Hungary and East Germany. (Soviet troops had left Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria shortly after the World War II, and were withdrawn from Rumania and Albania in 1958 and 1961, respectively.) A Warsaw Pact general staff was formed, located in Moscow and headed by a succession of Soviet generals. Joint military exercises were not held until 1962 and little genuine military integration took place, in contrast to NATO. Control of nuclear arms remained entirely Soviet, even when such arms were established on the territory of another member-state. This also stood in contrast to the "two-key" arrangement of nuclear arms control in NATO.

In the spring of 1966, the Soviet leadership, citing the heightened threat of a West Germany on the verge of gaining access to American nuclear weapons, began to press quietly for closer integration and (as in the earlier abortive CEMA proposal) for the creation of a truly supranational command structure. There is evidence that Poland and Czechoslovakia, the two countries most directly threatened by West German "revisionism," favored the proposal.

Rumania, considerably more distant from Germany, was again a source of opposition. In a major speech on May 7, 1966, Rumanian party chief Nicolae Ceausescu sharply criticized the existence of military blocs and foreign bases *in general*, referring to them as "anachronistic" and "incompatible with the national independence of the peoples."² The speech was followed by well-timed leaks to Western newsmen concerning secret Rumanian proposals for the rotation of the top Warsaw Pact command post among all mem-

¹ *East Europe*, July, 1966, p. 35.

² N. Ceausescu, *The Rumanian Communist Party—Continuer of the Rumanian People's Revolutionary Struggle* (Bucharest, Rumanian News Agency, n.d.), pp. 97-98.

ber-states and the creation of a veto-power by the East European states over the use of nuclear weapons on their territory. The leak was officially denied, but in an offhand manner that clearly indicated Rumania's displeasure over Soviet pressures for closer integration. Extensive negotiations then ensued, first bilaterally between Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Ceausescu in Bucharest, then at a Warsaw Pact foreign minister's meeting in Moscow, and finally at a full-dress meeting of the heads of government in Bucharest. The upshot of all this was again a Rumanian victory. The second Bucharest meeting issued communiques condemning United States policy in Vietnam, branding West Germany "revisionist," and calling for a major all-European conference. The matter of closer military integration, however, was quietly dropped and has not been raised again.

COHESION AND TENSION

Unquestionably, the Soviets encountered some difficulties in their efforts to link Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union following Stalin's death. These difficulties should not, however, be exaggerated. The Soviet-East European system is in no sense on the verge of disintegration. Powerful cohesive forces supplement the imperfect organizational structure of unity. Ideology is certainly one of these forces. No matter how independent the East European Communists may seem to be from time to time, they are still linked to one another, and to Moscow, by commitment both to the values and to most, if not all, the techniques of Marxism-Leninism. They are all believers in single-party elitism, public ownership and management of all major forms of production, together with fairly close control over the development of society itself. They share with the Soviet Union a commitment to peaceful coexistence as the best technique for advancing the process of global transition to communism, which they hold historically inevitable.

Contemporary trends in international and bloc affairs are also a cohesive force. The growing unity and power of West Europe,

while to some extent attractive to East European leaderships, is more generally a source of apprehension. Threatened, or at least frightened, by its dynamism, they look to the Soviet Union as a countervailing force. Particularly important in this regard is the German issue. The possibility of a reunited Germany laying claim to her former eastern territories—a possibility which the Soviet Union continually stresses to the East Europeans—is a matter of genuine concern throughout much, if not all, the area. Until this issue is permanently settled, we may expect the Soviet Union to be viewed as an essential ally and guarantor of the status quo in Eastern Europe.

Finally, there is the Sino-Soviet dispute. While it creates a certain bargaining advantage for East Europe, in the sense that the Russians must bid for East European support against China, it is surely a source of cohesion in the long run. By splitting the bloc into two great factions, it emphasizes the similarities of outlook and interest of those countries making up the more highly developed portion of the bloc. The strong support given to the Soviet Union by the East European leaderships at the 23d party congress last March was a good indicator of this common attitude. Even Rumania, which in the past tended to act as a mediator, drew closer to the Soviet position at that congress.

All of this is intimately connected with the Vietnam situation. Both the Soviet Union and the East European nations are extremely anxious to avoid direct involvement, yet they are fearful of losing influence to China in the underdeveloped world if they do not take a firm stand supporting North Vietnam. Deeper Soviet military involvement, if it threatened the security of East Europe itself, could of course destroy this common outlook on Vietnam. However, the Soviet leadership will surely hesitate for a long time before damaging its relations with East Europe in exchange for the dubious benefits of direct participation in the Vietnam War.

These, then, are some of the important sources of cohesion between the Soviet Union and the states of East Europe. Ranged

against them, however, and seriously limiting their effectiveness, are a number of sources of tension. It is difficult to generalize because East Europe is no longer the dull monotype it once was and Soviet relations with each country have their own special problems. Still, some observations can be made which have nearly universal applicability.

First, there is the phenomenon of what might be called "the maturation of party dictatorship." The regimes established in East Europe in the wake of the Red army were for the most part composed of men from the interwar Communist underground, who had never really held political power. Lacking popular support and uncertain of their own capacity as political leaders, they tended to rely very much upon the Soviet Union, not only for the maintenance of their power, but also for policy guidance. The autonomy and boldness of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which came to power largely by its own efforts during the Second World War, contrasted sharply with the dependency of the others, thereby providing a good negative illustration of this point. In several cases—e.g., Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary—this natural dependency was heightened by deep factional strife within the party.

With the passage of more than two decades, this situation has changed markedly. The East European regimes now have a sense of confidence borne of the long exercise of power. They also have a degree of popular support which was unthinkable at the time of the "revolutions" that placed them in power. This support is in turn due to the growing ability of East European communism to satisfy popular material aspirations in such areas as housing, welfare, and consumer goods production. While there is still much intraparty conflict, it is not the brutal, debilitating struggle of earlier years. In short, the East European parties have matured and consolidated themselves. Their power has become to some extent legitimized and with legitimization has come a freedom of action impossible earlier.

This new autonomy was shown very clearly

in the economic reform activity that began in East Europe in the early 1960's and is still under way in 1966. In the past, such reforms would have begun on cue from the Soviet Union and would have closely approximated Soviet practice (as in the case of the early post-Stalin "New Course" in 1953). But these current reforms were initiated independently of Soviet practice, and indeed, in several cases, somewhat in advance of similar Soviet moves. Czechoslovakia is currently implementing structural changes in its economy which will make it the most decentralized and market-oriented in the entire bloc. There is no "overall pattern": each regime is instituting reforms best suited to the problems and potentialities of its own economy, in many cases borrowing heavily from Western economic practices. The Soviet response to this, as we have seen, has been to emphasize the integrative role of CEMA. The failure to accomplish this emphasizes the extent of East European autonomy.

A second source of tension has been the revival of nationalism, not among the peoples of Eastern Europe, where it has been strong all along, but among their leaders, who had tended to downgrade or deny it in earlier years. This new interest in nationalism is intimately bound up with party maturation, for as the parties have grown stronger and begun to assert themselves against the Soviet Union, they have naturally turned to nationalism as a factor linking them with their own populations. This process has gone furthest in Rumania, where the party has intentionally stimulated anti-Soviet Rumanian nationalism, by public discussion of past Soviet policies against Rumania, and even by calling into question the present boundary between the two countries, which was imposed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II and which brought large numbers of Rumanian nationals under Soviet control.

Elsewhere, the turn to nationalism has been perhaps more subtle, but no less effective. The tremendous emphasis which the Polish Communist Party has placed upon celebrations in connection with the thousandth anniversary of Poland's founding in

1966 is a good example of the way East European regimes emphasize their identity.

Economic interest provides a further and probably most important source of tension with the Soviet Union. Divergent economic interests have, of course, existed all along. It was not to East Europe's benefit to undergo the economic exploitation of the Stalinist era, nor to accept unquestioningly the continued emphasis upon rapid heavy industrialization of the early Khrushchev era. What has changed is the perception and public discussion of the fact of divergence, past and present, and a new insistence by the East European regimes that all intrastate agreements with the Soviet Union must be based upon the principle of mutual interest and advantage. This is not an empty statement: in the negotiations over the new CEMA pricing system, the East Europeans are pressing hard for prices which accurately reflect costs, both for exports to the Soviet Union and for imports from it. More important, the East European economies are now strong enough—and important enough to Soviet economic well-being—to give this bargaining process real substance.

Again, all this should not be taken to imply that East Europe, as a whole or individually, is dissociating itself from the Soviet Union. As noted, there are strong pressures toward cohesion. The chief consequence of the tensions is a growing *equilibrium* between the Soviet Union and East Europe.

What conclusions can now be drawn about Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe? Given the absence of public debate over policy alternatives within the Soviet political elite, it is impossible to state with any certainty the real objectives of Soviet policy toward East Europe. Officially, the region is not distinguished as being one of special interest to Soviet policy. Thus, in his keynote speech to the 23d congress last March, First Secretary Brezhnev spoke at length about strengthening the "world socialist system" without in any way indicating a unique status for East Europe in that system. In fact, the East European states were lumped indiscrimi-

nately in his remarks with North Korea, Cuba, China and other non-European Communist states.

Yet it is difficult to believe that the present Soviet leadership does not in fact have a "special interest" in Eastern Europe. Even on a purely economic basis this would be the case, with over 50 per cent of the Soviet foreign trade turnover keyed to the East European economies. (Before the war this figure was around seven per cent). If to this very considerable economic interest, one adds the problem of Soviet relations with a revived and gradually unifying *West* Europe and the even graver problem of Sino-Soviet relations, it is apparent that the Soviet Union's need for close and harmonious relations with East Europe is very great indeed. The events of the last few years suggest that the primary objective of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe is to keep open the lines of communication and involvement with each individual Communist leadership, while cautiously promoting the development of integrative institutions capable of restricting the possibilities for independent action by any one country. As Warsaw Pact negotiations showed in the spring of 1966, this is a very delicate operation.

There is, however, no real alternative for the Soviet Union. A reversion to the charismatic-terroristic policy of Stalin, or to the military interventionism of 1956, is out of the question. The essence of Soviet relations with East Europe is now negotiation—a process of multilateral and bilateral dealings with leaderships which, although certainly not equal to the Soviet Union in power and prestige, are sufficiently autonomous to preclude any form of direct Soviet dictation.

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As this specialist evaluates the Sino-Soviet rift, "Whatever we hear in the months and years to come about worsening Sino-Soviet relations, we cannot rule out the chance that the conflict may be negotiated eventually and, at least to some extent, more Communist unity of purpose be reestablished some time after Mao's death."

The Sino-Soviet Conflict

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THE QUARREL between Moscow and Peking unquestionably constitutes one of the most important events of our era.* It not only affects relations among Communist-ruled states; its ramifications are worldwide. It may be a determining factor in the future development of international communism. It could lead to complications that would threaten the peace of the world.

During the last ten years, a fairly sizable body of literature, mainly articles, has come to the attention of interested observers.¹ But in the interpretation of these chronicles, we are confronted with many disagreements among Western scholars, who differ on the meaning, form, substance, and possible development of the conflict. Both historical and contemporary interpretations, as well as

estimates of future developments, have proved to be intensely individual. It seems to be difficult to eliminate bias from the position of the authors, a substantive bias that may have been generated for good reasons. The past experience of the observers; their original field of study, if any; the degree to which they are steeped in, or unfamiliar with, Communist affairs and the intricacies of Marxism-Leninism; and the extent to which their own cultural background has influenced their opinions in one way or another—all these considerations should be taken into account when studying works on the particulars of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Perhaps one of the most important problems which confronts the analysts of this conflict is their view of communism in the post-Stalinist world. For example, an observer who believes that the differences between histories and cultures, and a clash of national interests are the main determining factors of the struggle between Moscow and Peking would disagree with another observer who, while not denying that such differences exist, nevertheless believes that Marxism-Leninism, in whatever shape and form, has superseded or at least reduced the importance of such historical and cultural factors as nationalism.

A good case can be made for the difficulties and antagonisms between the Chinese and Russian empires prior to the Bolshevik

* The writer is much obliged for the valuable research assistance of M. A. Zinovieff of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University.

¹ Among recent studies of the Sino-Soviet conflict are: G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick Macfaquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961); K. London, ed., *Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61* (New York: Atheneum, 1964); William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964); William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65," *The China Quarterly* (January-March, 1966); Dennis J. Doolin, *Predatorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1965); and Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow* (New York: Mentor, 1964).

Revolution. However, to what extent the residue of this chapter of history can be transferred to the relations between the Soviet Union and Red China—particularly after Mao Tse-tung's victory over Chiang Kai-shek in 1949—is a debatable question. The answer must depend on how much importance the observer attributes to the totally different political and societal concept—communism—which became the basis of both the Soviet Union and Communist China. The complexity of the issues has been further compounded since 1956 when de-Stalinization began and the tactic of "peaceful coexistence with states of different social systems" became an overriding strategy of the Kremlin while the Mao regime remained in the violent throes of the extreme political fanaticism that has characterized it since its inception.

In the following paragraphs, an attempt will be made to point briefly to some of the elements which, in the view of this writer, are at the root of the conflict.

SOME BACKGROUND NOTES

From the very outset, relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) and the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) were not smooth. The C.C.P. was founded in 1921, and its weakness caused Stalin to order its cooperation with the Kuomintang (K.M.T.) within the framework of a "united front." The C.C.P. obeyed, hoping to gain influence over the K.M.T. and gradually to prevail. But after Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek took over and in 1927 almost wiped out the Communists. After this debacle, it is logical to assume that Mao and his comrades, although still submitting to Comintern discipline, quietly began to differentiate between the revolutions in Russia and China.

² Even now, the Chinese Communists are defending Stalin's role: "Stalin's merits and mistakes are matters of historical, objective reality. A comparison of the two shows that his merits outweighed his faults. He was primarily correct, and his faults were secondary." See "On the Question of Stalin," second Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongqi* [hereafter *Comment*], September 13, 1963 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 6.

Even before he became chairman of the party in the mid-1930's, Mao, while not defying Stalin's orders, developed his thinking along the lines of adjusting European Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. For example, when Stalin, who had severed relations with Chiang after the 1927 massacre, renewed diplomatic relations with the K.M.T. in Nanking as a result of the Japanese invasion of 1931, the C.C.P. was willing to unify anti-Japanese elements but did not cooperate seriously with the K.M.T. leadership. For his part, Chiang fought harder against the Communists than against the Japanese and continued his policy of liquidating C.C.P. members. In order to save the hard core of the Red army, Chu Teh led it through 6,000 miles of hardship to Shensi province in 1934, the famous Long March.

Fifteen years later Mao conquered. But the Kremlin, rudely shocked by this unexpected victory, did not make it easy for the Chinese comrades. Soviet economic aid was skimpy; Port Arthur and Dairen were restored to China only in 1952; and the Manchurian loot was never returned. Nevertheless, in 1950, when Mao went to Moscow to ask for help, Stalin was still regarded by the Chinese Communists as the great leader of the Communist movement and whatever resentment the Chinese Communists retained from the early days of their party's history was suppressed by party discipline.² These were still the days of the monolith, when Communist unity seemed to embrace the governments of one billion human beings. At that time, the only power which prevented the Communists from making further inroads into the non-Communist world was the United States. With its allies in Europe and Asia, it stood in the way of a global Communist takeover. Furthermore, the United States arsenal of nuclear weapons ruled out large-scale Communist ventures. Such was the situation when Stalin died in 1953. A period of transition began under Georgi Malenkov which lasted until Nikita Khrushchev took over in 1955.

For the Chinese Communists, the legacy of Stalin remained unchallenged until two

events happened: first, in 1955, Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin made their pilgrimage to Belgrade to appease Yugoslavia's President Tito; second, soon thereafter, at the 20th congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1956, the Stalinist era was ended by the brutal denigration of Stalin, the elevation of peaceful coexistence from a tactic to a strategic policy, the thesis that war was no longer "fatally inevitable," and the inauguration of what became known as polycentrism. Consequently, the lid came off the boiling East European kettle, resulting in unrest in Poland and an anti-Communist revolution in Hungary. Immediately after the 20th congress, the Chinese, reacting slowly and cautiously, still appeared to go along with the Soviet thesis. One might say that in 1957, at the Moscow Communist summit, unity seemed to have been reestablished by a remarkable feat of Soviet diplomacy.

We know now, through the publication of the "correspondence" between the C.P.S.U. and the C.C.P., that the 20th party congress was considered by Peking to be the beginning of a process of deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. In the *Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU*, the C.C.P. stated:

From the very outset we held that a number of views advanced at the 20th Congress concerning the contemporary international struggle and the international movement were wrong, were violations of Marxism-Leninism. In particular the complete negation of Stalin on the pretext of combating the personality cult and the thesis of peaceful transition to socialism by the parliamentary road are gross errors of principle.³

The Chinese leaders complained bitterly that Moscow had consulted neither with them nor with any other Communist party. The C.P.S.U. leadership was deemed to have crudely interfered in the internal affairs of fraternal parties and countries on the pretext of "combating the personality cult." To explain the four-year hiatus between 1956 and 1960, the Chinese Communists added that they had kept silent

³ "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," first *Comment*, September 6, 1963, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

. . . for the sake of unity against the enemy and out of consideration for the difficult position the leaders of the CPSU were in . . . and also because the leaders of the CPSU had not yet departed so far from Marxism-Leninism as they did later. . . . We fervently hoped at the time that the leaders of the CPSU would put their errors right . . .⁴

In the years after 1956, the continuing conflict between the policies in Moscow and Peking slowly escalated and became acute in 1960 during the Bucharest meeting and various other party congresses. It came into the world arena on April 16, 1960, when *Hung Ch'i* published an article under the title "Long Live Leninism!" From then on, relations rapidly worsened and the political demise of Khrushchev created hardly more than a short breathing spell.

The timetable of events that led to a state of political warfare between Moscow and Peking can be found in the aforementioned books. This brief essay is merely trying to suggest the reasons behind the conflict. Three aspects of this intra-Communist confrontation seem to be most pertinent: first, the differences in the interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology; second, the struggle for the leadership of world communism; and third, Chinese charges of Soviet-United States collaboration in Vietnam.

IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES

If, as has been stated so often by Communists, Marxism-Leninism is only a guide to action, the Soviets would seem to be the better Leninists. Neither Marx nor Lenin would have approved of the extreme dogmatic rigidity of the Chinese leaders. During the past decades, the world has changed more radically than in several previous centuries. Consequently, politics and doctrines, spiritual or secular, have to adjust to these changes. The Soviet leaders, after the end of the Stalin era, correctly concluded that modifications of the doctrine had to be introduced to keep ideology and policy viable, to cope with the modern world. In contrast, for the Chinese Communists, Marxism-Leninism remained identical with sinicized Stalinism. Consequently, differences of opinion arose on such

vital ideological issues as the noninevitability of war, peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition to socialism and communism, and the theory of "the state of all the people."

The Non-Inevitability of War. On the question of war and peace, one must differentiate between theoretical statements and practical actions. The Khrushchevian thesis of 1956 does not exclude war, for while war is not considered inevitable it is still possible: "As long as imperialism lasts there will always be a soil for wars of aggression."⁵ If war does occur, it will be the end of the imperialists, for the "forces of peace" have become so strong that they are unbeatable. This formula was accepted and signed by all 81 Communist parties in November, 1960. Thus the difference in the interpretation of Communist war doctrine between the U.S.S.R. and Red China lies in the implementation of this thesis. Both parties have issued comparable statements in various degrees of belligerency but—especially after the escalation of the Vietnam war—Peking has topped Moscow in the war of words. Moreover, Moscow's statement that peaceful coexistence must be replete with an "unremitting ideological, political, and economic struggle of the working people inside the capitalist system, including armed struggle when the people find it necessary"⁶ has been implemented with considerable caution.

For Peking, Mao's military concept, certainly the most original of his otherwise derivative "thoughts," is based not only on military and pragmatic cognition, but also on certain doctrinal principles. After the launching of the first Soviet Sputnik, the Chinese

⁵ See the Declaration of 1957 signed by 12 Communist parties including the Chinese party, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. IX, No. 47 (January 1, 1958), p. 4.

⁶ "Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPC," March 30, 1963, translated in *The Polemic in the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 506.

⁷ See "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace," fifth Comment, November 19, 1963, pp. 14-22.

⁸ Leo Grulio (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies II, The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 36.

claimed that the balance of power had changed in favor of the socialist camp. Therefore, Peking pronounced, it was no longer necessary to negotiate important issues with the imperialists; in any event, the readiness of the West to negotiate was merely an empty gesture. While one should try to avoid a nuclear war, still one should not fear it. The Chinese have since frequently attacked the Russians as cowardly because of their attitude towards United States nuclear capability.

Specifically, the Chinese charge the Soviets with failing to realize that a new world war is preventable, not because the imperialists suddenly desire peace, but only through the concerted action of Communist parties and the increased political consciousness of the toiling masses in the imperialist countries. In addition, the Soviets allegedly think only in terms of preventing a new world war and ignore the real possibility that imperialism may unleash a world war unilaterally. The second alternative must be taken into account no less than the first, according to the Chinese. Finally, the Chinese argument concludes, the possibility of preventing a new world war must not be confused with the possibility of preventing all wars, including national liberation struggles. This latter category of wars will prevail as long as imperialism exists.⁷

Peaceful Coexistence. In his address to the C.P.S.U.'s 20th party congress, Khrushchev claimed that "the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems has always been and remains the general line of our country's foreign policy."⁸

The Chinese have angrily denied charges that they reject this thesis. Rather, they maintain that the C.P.S.U. leadership has wilfully misinterpreted the principle of peaceful coexistence. First, Khrushchev and his successors are accused of failing to realize that peaceful coexistence has become a possibility only through the growing strength of the socialist camp and the increased political activity of the working masses in the imperialist countries. To attain and maintain peaceful coexistence, they believe, continued

struggles must be waged against imperialism for it will never voluntarily abandon its hope to destroy its class enemy, i.e., the toilers of the world. The C.P.S.U. leadership, on the other hand, proclaims that peaceful coexistence is possible, not through "tit-for-tat" struggles with imperialism, but because the imperialists have, miraculously and in profound contradiction to Marxist-Leninist tenets, admitted its necessity and now actively desire its achievement.

Secondly, the Chinese Communists object strenuously to making peaceful coexistence the "general line of foreign policy" for socialist countries. The C.P.S.U. leadership is asked to explain on what basis the relations of socialist states with one another should be built. Surely such relations must go beyond those which are practiced vis-à-vis imperialist powers and must be based rather on the fundamental principle of proletarian internationalism. Moreover, Peking states, peaceful coexistence alone certainly does not suffice to maintain a relationship between the socialist camp and the oppressed peoples who are in desperate need of aid and assistance.

A third alleged difference in principle on the question of peaceful coexistence between the Chinese and Soviet leaders centers around the practice of peaceful coexistence by Communist parties and the international Communist movement. In the Chinese view, only sovereign countries can pursue peaceful coexistence. But the relationship between the proletariat which is not yet in power and its oppressors is one of a revolutionary nature and does not allow peaceful coexistence. Only after the victory of the revolution can the proletariat, if circumstances permit, follow the policy of peaceful coexistence.⁹

Peaceful Transition to Socialism and Communism. Another issue of contention be-

⁹ See "Peaceful Coexistence—Two Diametrically Opposed Policies," sixth *Comment*, December 12, 1963, pp. 21-33.

¹⁰ Leo Grulow (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹¹ See "The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism," eighth *Comment*, March 31, 1964 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 11-18.

¹² See *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January, 1961), p. 22.

tween the two leaderships is the question of the gradual peaceful transition from (a) capitalist to socialist society, and (b) socialist to Communist society. In consonance with the theses pronounced at the 20th C.P.S.U. congress that war is no longer "fatally inevitable" and that peaceful coexistence is the proper relationship between states with different social systems, Khrushchev's report to the congress also stressed the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism:

The winning of a firm parliamentary majority based on the mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and of the working people would create conditions for the working class of many capitalist and formerly colonial countries to make fundamental social changes.¹⁰

This meant that in fact the time of revolutionary warfare had passed and that it was possible, if not probable, to acquire power through parliamentary means. It was a down-grading of the principle of class struggle and, as such, unacceptable to the Chinese.

The C.C.P. strongly opposed Khrushchev's contention (which is shared by the present C.P.S.U. leadership) and claimed that a parliamentary victory is at best an auxiliary means, that it does not smash the state machinery, that it may weaken the action of Communist parties, and that altogether this approach of the 20th C.P.S.U. congress had never been accepted by the C.C.P.¹¹

In a report on the Moscow Conference of 1960, Khrushchev significantly modified his earlier contention by declaring that

. . . to win a majority in parliament and transform it into an organ of the people's power, given a powerful revolutionary movement in the country, means smashing the military-bureaucratic machine of the bourgeoisie and setting up a new proletarian people's state in parliamentary form.¹²

The Chinese in "Long Live Leninism!" had stated that

. . . it would be in the best interest of the people if the proletariat could attain power and carry out the transition to socialism by peaceful means. . . . it would be wrong not to make use of such

a possibility when it occurs . . . but the peaceful development of the revolution should never be regarded as the only possibility and it is therefore necessary to be prepared at the same time for the . . . non-peaceful development of the revolution.¹³

As to the transition from socialism to communism, Peking rejected Moscow's contention that, due to the new weapons technology, the people should not be compelled to pay too high a price for socialist victory, but that the development should proceed step by step. To the Chinese Communists, technology and economics alone cannot achieve victory; such a statement disregards dialectical materialism. On the contrary, the class struggle, as applied to international relations, is still a decisive factor. The transition from socialism to communism must not be delayed.

Therefore, the impatient Chinese leaders have sought to hasten the development toward communism by combining rapid industrial development and an all-embracing collectivization. The "Big Leap Forward" and the establishment of "peoples' communes" in 1958 were more than instrumentalities. They were attempts to skip the stage of socialism which Soviet doctrine held to be absolutely essential prior to the transition to communism, ever since Stalin determined in 1932 that the foundation of socialism must be built first.

Twenty years later, Stalin regarded the achievement of this task as assured and Khrushchev strove to initiate the long period of transition to communism by 1965. Mao's attempt to regard the communes as a contribution to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, by proceeding to communism without having fulfilled the aims of socialism, was rank heresy in Soviet eyes. The Chinese offered this concept to those underdeveloped countries which were as impatient as they for rapid development. Liu Shao-ch'i hinted as much in "Problems of Peace and Socialism" in October, 1959. We know, of course, that the scheme failed. But we cannot be sure

that it will not be repeated in a different form at a later time if Maoist fanaticism continues to prevail.

"*The State of All the People.*" The difference between Moscow's concept and Peking's concept of the theory of the state has become another chief issue in their dispute. To the Soviets, their state has become a "state of all the people" and, therefore, a proletarian dictatorship is no longer needed. Socialism has been achieved, and the next phase, the transition to communism, is in sight. What kind of a state is the "state of all the people"? Like the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is a socialist state in which the working class retains its leading role. But in the more developed state there is evident a "broadening of the social base" because

. . . the state that previously embodied the dictatorship of a single class becomes an organ of the unity and cooperation of all the working classes and sectors of the population.¹⁴

In the "state of all the people" there is also evident a decreased emphasis on coercive functions. Indeed, the internal class struggle is over and there is no further need to suppress the exploiter classes. Rather, stress is laid on the educational and politico-persuasive functions of the state. Force as such is no longer directed at entire classes but is only applied against criminal elements. In the Soviet view, the preservation of the methods of proletarian dictatorship, i.e., class suppression, at a stage when the exploiter classes have already been liquidated, carries with it the dangerous possibility that these methods may be used not against enemies but against allies of the proletariat.

To the Chinese, however, the concept of the "state of all the people" is modern revisionism at its worst. Bourgeois elements are still present, they claim, and the proletarian dictatorship is essential to secure the goals of the revolution. Contradictions do exist within the people, even under a Marxist-Leninist party, and may endanger the success of the revolution.

To compound this maze of Marxist-Leninist scholasticism, Mao's addiction to his theory of contradictions helps to keep the quarrel

¹³ See *Peking Review*, No. 17 (1960).

¹⁴ *Pravda*, December 6, 1964, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 16, No. 48 (December 23, 1964), pp. 3-4.

alive. This dialectical *tour de force* was first discussed by Mao as early as 1937. Twenty years later, when differences of opinion between Moscow and Peking became apparent, he wrote his essay, "The Current Solutions of Contradictions in the People." Basically, Mao viewed all emanations of life as the outcome of a struggle between contradictory positions. (This is nothing new; Marx said so a century ago.) Without contradictions, there could be no life nor development. Therefore, contradictions also permeate socialist society.

Mao added to Marx by proposing that such contradictions may be "antagonistic" or "non-antagonistic." He did not see anything wrong with nonantagonistic contradictions in a socialist state, assuming that such problems could be resolved. However, he claimed that nonantagonistic contradictions could become antagonistic even in a socialist society or among such societies. He probably regards as antagonistic Moscow-Peking relations.

Significantly, the Soviet ideologists virtually ignored this theory. Khrushchev was reported to have termed it "nonsensical" in a talk with the then Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. But Chairman Mao's theory of contradiction was reaffirmed by the C.C.P. central committee in its eleventh meeting in August, 1966. It was stated that Mao had been correct when, at the tenth plenary session, he had "stressed once again the theory of contradictions" as the "guide for the socialist revolution and socialist construction in our country."¹⁵

It is possible that the single-mindedness with which the Mao regime continues to challenge the Kremlin is, at least in part, the result of Mao's obsession with the concept of contradictions. Peking, in its total dedication to sinicized Marxism-Leninism, presses its political concepts, both internal and external, to fit this ideological mold. In contrast, the Soviet leaders, although remaining within a broad, general, Marxist-Leninist framework, have developed a far more pragmatic approach, especially since Khrushchev ended Stalinist rigidity.

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, August 14, 1966, p. 24.

There is no indication that the frenzy of Maoism will let up during Mao's lifetime. In contrast to his apparent disregard of the realities of the modern world, the Soviets are conscious of the changes that have occurred and are afraid lest ideological fanaticism lead to a destruction of all they created in the nearly half century since the victory of the October Revolution.

STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP

The quarrel between the two leaderships also indicates a struggle for Communist leadership. While Joseph Stalin was alive, he was the uncontested leader of world communism. His successors, in the view of Peking, are not worthy of him; on the other hand, Mao claims to represent the pure Leninist tradition against "modern revisionists." In the aforementioned first *Comment*, we find the following phrase:

The facts of the past seven years [i.e., 1956–1963] have amply proved that the differences between the Chinese and Soviet parties and within the international Communist movement have arisen solely because the leadership of the CPSU has departed from Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement and pursued a revisionist and splitting line in the international Communist movement . . . that the differences are between proletarian internationalism and great-power chauvinism. . . . This erroneous line of the CPSU has brought the international Communist movement face to face with the danger of a split of unprecedented gravity. . . .

On the other hand, the *Comment* reads,
 . . . the CCP has constantly striven . . . to up-

(Continued on page 242)

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Pointing out that in the Soviet Union, "the leaders are faced with a society characterized by cynicism and apathy for which they have no ready remedy," this specialist maintains that the bureaucratic style of the Russian leadership "is hardly likely to counteract this growing mood." In addition, the leaders face "the growing pluralization of Soviet society, . . . reflected in the emergence of interest groups hoping to exert a growing influence over policy. . . ."

Soviet Politics and Interest Groups

By BARBARA B. GREEN

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RECENT ASSESSMENTS of current developments within the Soviet Union vary widely, ranging from a belief that the regime of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin has managed to replace ideological fervor by dull, neutral, stable pragmatism, to the belief that the Soviet Union is on the verge of internal disruption or revolution.¹ In fact, these divergent assessments do not necessarily contradict each other. It has been argued that the replacement of revolutionary dynamism by bureaucratic stagnation is one factor which could well endanger the Communist Party for, if its ideological fervor were lost, it would in turn lose its monopoly on talent and loyalty. In the absence of major successes in domestic or foreign policy, another organization, such as the army, able to maintain an esprit de corps and attract talent, might even be tempted to try to assume power in the event of disagreement in the Politbureau. It has also been suggested that

disaffected nationalities might attempt to secede from the Soviet Union. Profound disaffection has been attributed to the intelligentsia, to political "outs" demoted since the fall of Nikita Khrushchev, and to other strata of the population.

Views of the Soviet Union tend to have a pendulum quality. Until recently most analysts labeled the Soviet Union totalitarian. Since a totalitarian state by definition eliminates the social groups of pluralistic society, this eliminated the need to study interest groups. In fact, of course, rival factions and groups have always existed behind the monolithic facade of the party. With the demise of Joseph Stalin, many Soviet specialists were at first reluctant to acknowledge that the totalitarian features of Soviet society were becoming atrophied, while others predicted the transformation of the Soviet Union into a traditional authoritarian or even a democratic regime. Recently, the existence of group politics in the Soviet Union has become too evident to ignore. This has forced a reappraisal of the nature of Soviet politics. As noted above, some see the existence of semi-autonomous groups as constituting a threat to the very survival of Communist Party rule. Others, however, while recognizing that the existence of these groups is of vital importance and will have a profound effect upon the evolution of Soviet society and government, feel that they should be treated as interest groups attempting to influence government

¹ See William Henry Chamberlin, "The Trend after Khrushchev: Immobilism," *The Russian Review*, XXV (January, 1966), pp. 3-9; Robert Conquest, *Russia After Khrushchev* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," *Problems of Communism*, XV (January-February, 1966), pp. 1-15; Michel Tatu, "The Beginning of the End?", *Problems of Communism*, XV (March-April, 1966), pp. 44-47.

² See Frederick Barghoorn, "Changes in Russia: The Need for Perspectives," *Problems of Communism*, XV (May-June, 1966), pp. 39-42; H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, XVIII (April, 1966), pp. 435-451.

policy rather than as potential alternatives to the government itself.²

POWER POLITICS IN THE U.S.S.R.

A review of certain aspects of recent power rivalry in the Soviet Union may shed some light on the interaction of these institutional groups. Although it is customary to speak of the leading role of the Communist Party, Stalin, as we know, actually downgraded the party as an institution in an effort to create competing hierarchies of power, thereby insuring that there would be no point of resolution short of himself. So, under Stalin, beneath the monolithic facade of totalitarian government, various organizations and institutions were locked in struggle. Upon his death and with the formation of collective leadership, the prime contenders for Stalin's mantle used different bases of power: party, government, and police. The elimination of Lavrenty Beria also eliminated the secret police as a base in the struggle. This left Georgi Malenkov with a base in the government apparatus and Khrushchev with the control of the party apparatus after his election as first secretary on September 13, 1953. With the resignation of Malenkov in February, 1955, Khrushchev strengthened his position and seemed to be in control. However, the Hungarian revolution in the fall of 1956 weakened his prestige and reopened the struggle for leadership.

In December, Khrushchev's rivals in the central committee moved to enhance the position of those connected with the government rather than with the party. Khrushchev did not stand idly by, but moved in to attack. His establishment of the regional economic councils in February, 1957, weakened the governmental administration while strengthening his supporters in the territorial party organization. The party was left as the primary centralizing agency. After the unsuccessful attempt to force his resignation in June, 1957, Khrushchev was able to reconstitute the Presidium with his own supporters.

The governmental administration was then eliminated as a challenge to the party. This meant that Khrushchev could not base his power on competing hierarchies as Stalin had done. Rather, he used the party as the instrument by which to gain and maintain ascendancy.

Perhaps because he felt himself a prisoner of the party which he had done so much to strengthen, beginning in 1961, Khrushchev began to weaken party control. Members of the Presidium, although they were his men, had developed an institutional interest in the prerogatives of the Presidium. Khrushchev's appeals directly to the people over the heads of the Presidium members seemed to constitute a threat to the power of the Presidium. The new party rules providing for rotation in office promulgated at the 22d party congress in October, 1961, were intended to provide for a circulation of the elite without resorting to terror. However, they also carried a threat to the members of the Presidium and other leading party organs.

The reorganization of the party in November, 1962, into an industrial and an agricultural hierarchy followed. This move was a violation of the Leninist principle of never dividing the party, and created conflict at lower levels. The division of the party meant that there were two obkom* first secretaries in most areas. The obkom first secretary had been a key figure in the party, one who had considerable independence and power. Although very few of these officials lost their positions, their power was divided and diluted. In most cases the original first secretaries headed the agricultural obkoms, while new and younger men were brought in to head the industrial obkoms. Professor John Armstrong feels that the original first secretaries may have felt that this was only the first step, and that Khrushchev intended to replace the older party leaders with more youthful men.³ Furthermore, the secretaries had always served on the central committee of the party and the original members may have felt that they would not all be able to retain their positions on this body. They thus

* Editors note: The *obkom* is the party committee covering each province, or *oblast*. The *oblast* is the Soviet territorial-administrative unit.

³ John Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests," *Soviet Studies*, XVII (April, 1966), pp. 417-430.

had a common group interest in eliminating the changes introduced by Khrushchev. This, in part, accounts for their support of the Presidium in the removal of Khrushchev. Perhaps in payment for their support, the obkomis were reunified after Khrushchev's removal. This brief summary of power conflict in the U.S.S.R. should make it apparent that the struggle did not take place among isolated individuals but rather among contending groups.

THE GROWTH OF PRESSURE GROUPS

Khrushchev's period of ascendancy was characterized by a growing heterogeneity of the elite accompanied by increasing differentiation within the society. The institutional rivalry meant that the governing apparatus was shot through with competition. At the same time Soviet society experienced the formation of various groupings with their own interests and values, eager to influence policy but not actually to rule. These groups, although clearly not so powerful or well-organized as American interest groups, have in some cases been able to influence policy. The lawyers with their close professional ties and common interest in preserving legality were able to influence the law reforms. Educators had some influence on the implementation of Khrushchev's reforms in their field. Discussions by economists and planners have clearly influenced government policy. In the immediate post-Khrushchev period they have encouraged the experimentation that has taken place. The October, 1965, "factory charter" which provides greater freedom and responsibility for factory managers may encourage the formation of another professional grouping with common interests and strong motivation to influence government policy. Trade unions also increased their role under Khrushchev, to the point that managers complained they were unable to discharge anyone. The intellectuals began to exert influence on government policies and to stand up to Khrushchev himself, although they, like other

groups, were divided among themselves.⁴

Much attention has been focused on the army as a highly organized group with a strong esprit de corps. The army has even been seen as a potential rival to the party and some observers hypothesize that if the Soviet Union were to experience serious difficulties or fail to achieve significant successes, the army might stage a coup. There is no question but that the influence of the army increased enormously in the last year or two of Khrushchev's rule and that it was able to influence military policy. However, the military is not a solid phalanx; rather, it is characterized by differentiation of views on military doctrine and shot through with inter-service rivalry. It will most probably continue to be a powerful group whose leaders must be listened to, but it seems likely that it will be more interested in influencing governmental policy than in actually attempting to seize power. Its influence in the military field will reverberate throughout Soviet society, since it will be deeply concerned with economic priorities. This interest in heavy industry and military hardware will create conflicts with the economists and managerial groups who may well have other priorities.

Other less well integrated groupings in Soviet society—minority members, youth, peasants, workers, consumers—also are developing interests of their own which may have some effect on Soviet policy. The Ukrainians are often referred to as a nationality group which may have secessionist tendencies. This evaluation, however, seems to be based more upon historical evidence than on present realities. Given the large number of Ukrainians in the present party leadership it seems unlikely that Ukrainian nationalism could become so highly inflamed as to lead to secession. Nevertheless, it is true that broad social groupings are becoming more articulate in expressing their common interests and aspirations.

In order to have group politics it is necessary not only to have groups, but for the groups to have access to the means of influencing government policy. Such means too are not totally lacking in the Soviet Union,

⁴ See Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and The Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture 1962-1964* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

although they are far fewer in number and importance than those existing in the United States. Groups attempt to influence policy through articulation of their views at professional meetings. Newspapers and journals express the vital concerns of various organized groups and even reflect differences of opinion within groups. In recent years it has become possible to speak of liberal and conservative journals, liberal and conservative editors. Interest groups have even come to have some influence on policy at the very summit of power. Under Khrushchev, Presidium members were given assignments in specific areas and often became spokesmen for the areas they supervised. This provided a channel for interest groups and an area for bargaining and compromise.

GROWING APATHY

This growth of group politics in the Soviet Union has taken place against a background of real apathy. Only Khrushchev, with his attempts to stir up the country by the use of old-fashioned oratory, seemed out of place. The removal of Khrushchev and his replacement by Brezhnev and Kosygin appeared to herald a new era of stable impersonal bureaucratic dictatorship. This atmosphere set the stage for the 23d party congress scheduled for the spring of 1966.

Prior to the opening of the party congress, there was a spate of rumors that a reassessment of Stalin was pending. It appears that the leadership, alarmed by growing apathy and cynicism, wished to call a halt to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies. The leaders may also have feared the growth of pluralistic groups in the society, feeling that these groups might constitute a challenge to their power. Long accustomed to a monolithic society, they may well have felt threatened by the new phenomenon of interest groups, especially in the absence of either a dynamic unifying ideology or an acknowledged single

⁵ See Isaac Deutscher, "Time of Trouble: The Twenty-Third Congress," *Monthly Review*, XVIII (June, 1966), pp. 1-13; and Isaac Deutscher, "The Old Party and the Young People," *The Nation*, CCII (May 2, 1966), pp. 517-520.

⁶ *Pravda*, March 31, 1966, p. 4.

leader. Then, too, they may have wished to indicate what they considered to be the legitimate limits to dissent.

The rumors in turn aroused protests among writers, artists, scientists, and others who feared a return to Stalinist practice. These protests culminated in public demonstrations and collective letters to party leaders.⁵ They had their effect, demonstrating that, however much the leadership may wish to limit dissenting groups, it must take their views into account in formulating policies. As a result, there was no clear reassessment of Stalin, but rather a compromise. The personality cult was denounced, but it was emphasized that this should not lead to the erasure of the Soviet Union's heroic history. This view, of course, was understandable since if the leadership were to condone the condemnation of the entire Stalinist era and then take the lead in denouncing Khrushchev and his policies there would be little left to inspire the populace.

THE 23d CONGRESS

The party congress which opened on March 29 was the largest in history, with 4,942 delegates as compared to 1,355 in 1956. It was characterized by sobriety and conducted in a businesslike manner. As D. A. Kunayev, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, put it:

. . . The present style of Party leadership gives us a sense of confidence and multiplies our energies. There is no haste and fuss now. The Central Committee Presidium combines exactingness toward cadres with trust and respect for them. Plenary sessions of the Central Committee are now being conducted in a businesslike way, without noise, pomp and bombast. . . .⁶

This new "contra-Khrushchev" style was accompanied by a retreat from Khrushchev reforms and a greater emphasis on authoritarianism. There seemed to be a fear of innovation and risk accompanied by a desire to draw the line between the permissible and the forbidden. The leaders seemed to be saying, "So far and no further." Brezhnev noted that the division of the party into agricultural and industrial hierarchies had been revoked and he condemned the disruption caused by con-

stant shifts in personnel. The change in name from Presidium back to Politbureau and the resuscitation of the title "General Secretary" were of symbolic importance, signifying continuity with the past.

At Brezhnev's suggestion, the congress abolished the provisions on rotation in office which had been introduced at the 22d party Congress. The retention of this provision would have meant a constant change in the membership of the leading party organs; furthermore, none of the members of the Politbureau could have been certain of his position. The present leadership is intent on stability, not change. There was, therefore, ample reason to abolish this provision.

The party congress also reinstated the national party conference to meet between sessions of the party congress. The significance of this is not entirely clear, although it may be intended for situations in which a large sounding board is desired without the excitement of an extraordinary party congress. Unlike the party congress to which members are elected, all delegates at party conferences are appointed, which may better insure control by the top hierarchy, although it is difficult to see any real difference in practice. Other changes in party rules were perhaps more significant. Entrance rules were made more difficult and rules governing expulsion more stringent while the role of the party control committees was increased. All these measures seem to reflect a desire on the part of the leadership for stability and a fear of radical change.

This same attitude was reflected in the economic field. Brezhnev spoke of miscalculations in the seven-year plan completed in 1965, asserting that its goals were not always "actual possibilities." He then stated, "There must be no unrealistic provisions in our plans for the future." The new five-year plan, while more modest in its goals, does provide for a rapid rate of growth. Producer goods are to be increased by 49 to 52 per cent and consumer goods by 43 to 46 per cent. Thus more resources are to go into the consumer field than in the past, but the development

of heavy industry will continue its predominance. The plan is, in this respect, a compromise of various interests. It also provides for some economic reforms, but falls short of the hopes of many reformers. An increase in centralized planning is to be combined with greater initiative and independence for individual enterprises. Again, caution is the watchword. (For a summary of the new five-year plan, see pages 238 ff. of this issue.)

A SOVIET DILEMMA

The tremendous concentration on writers and literary matters at the congress reveals deep-seated concern on the part of the leadership. Mikhail Sholokhov, with the prestige of his recent Nobel Prize, was brought in to chastise Soviet writers in vociferous language. This was perhaps not surprising in view of the recent trial of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel and the criticism voiced by foreign Communist parties. Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate an interesting dilemma faced by the Soviet party leadership; it is berated for intervening in the domestic affairs of other Communist parties, while it is, at the same time, faced with criticism by other parties for its own domestic policies. In fact, in certain cases, foreign Communist parties tend to act as interest groups seeking to influence Soviet policy. In any event, the party leadership showed itself determined to exert control over the liberal writers and artists.

The party did not return to Stalinism, but rather tried to draw the line between what is and what is not permissible. Brezhnev insisted that the party opposes administration by fiat or arbitrary decisions, but will fight all manifestations of alien ideology. He attacked those who denigrate the system. Alex-

(Continued on page 246)

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"In simplest terms," writes this economist, "the problems of Soviet planning today lie in the fact that the old system has outgrown itself...." He concludes that "substantial changes seem to be in prospect...."

The Soviet Economy

By ARTHUR W. WRIGHT
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THE STATE OF THE SOVIET economy has received considerable attention in the past few years from Soviet policy-makers and foreign observers alike. There were strong economic overtones to the removal (in October, 1964) of Nikita S. Khrushchev from his top posts in both the party and the government. It was hardly a coincidence that his successor as government premier, Aleksei N. Kosygin, was an industrial management and planning expert. Furthermore, economic problems and proposed solutions have preoccupied not merely the 23d party congress, but also all recent plenary sessions of the party's central committee.¹

Behind the attention being directed to the economic front lie some basic economic problems. Most important is a lagging economic growth rate. Directly related problems include a weak agricultural sector; a creaking

industrial planning system; and pressures for more consumer goods and larger defense outlays. The ferment attending these problems suggests novelty and change. Yet the "novelty" is easily exaggerated: all these problems, and some of the remedies which have been mooted, trace their roots back at least a decade.

I

A bit of background will help place recent events in perspective.

Even if everything in the Soviet economy today were new, it would still not represent such a sharp departure from the past. The Soviet period of Russian history is after all a mere half century. Of that period, a total of more than a decade was taken up with a bitter civil war (hard on the heels of the devastation of World War I) and the preparations for, waging of, and recovery from World War II. In the remaining time, the Russian economy has been transformed from a largely rural, peasant-smallhold condition with only a small (and decrepit) industrial sector, into the world's second largest modern industrial economy. Whether one likes or dislikes the process developed to effect the transformation, it was certainly rapid.

The new Bolshevik government in 1917 inherited a budding, but wartorn and rundown, industrial base from its imperial predecessors. Following an eight-year period of breath catching, stock taking and heated debate—under the "New Economic Policy"²

¹ Plenary sessions and their agenda:
October 14, 1964—removal of Khrushchev
November 16, 1964—major change in the party economic-administrative apparatus
March 24–26, 1965—agricultural policy proposals; report on international party meetings
September 27–29, 1965—planning and management changes
February 19, 1966—draft directives of the new five-year plan
The 23d party congress, March 29–April 9, 1966: Brezhnev's "state of the union" report; Kosygin's report on the new five-year plan; assorted party business; elections; approval of reports.

² For details of the NEP, see Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (1st edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1950), pp. 101–107. An interpretation of the NEP from a Marxian point of view is given by Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), chapters 6–8.

(NEP) of 1921–1928 — Soviet leaders charted a sequence of five-year plans (see Table 1) designed to build up the industrial sector rapidly. Their policy rested on two major programs: (1) investment in capacity that could create more capacity (basic metals, machinery and Lenin's favorite, electrification); and (2) collectivization of the peasantry. There is not space to go into the debates and policy shifts, or the staggering administrative problems and human consequences involved in driving the peasants from their smallholds into the collective farms.³ Suffice it to say that on balance, the collectivization fulfilled the main task set for it, namely, provisioning the burgeoning heavy-industrial sector with vital raw materials, food and labor, in larger quantities and at lower cost (to the state if not to the people) than would have prevailed under even an improved version of the old system. In spite of substantial shortcomings, especially in recent years, the collective farm is still an important feature of Soviet agriculture—a subject to which we shall return later on.

The rapid and extensive mobilization of resources required for the “industrialization drive” was achieved by the development of the Soviet industrial planning system. The basic purpose of Soviet planning was (and remains) effective central control over resource allocation. Such control can in principle be attained either through absolute centralization of every decision; or through centralization of only the basic outlines of policy, implementing them with a set of incentives which channel lower-level decisions, made in individuals’ self-interest, into plan fulfillment.

The former alternative was never real for the Russians: their economy was just too big, economically and geographically, to cover every detail of economic life from Moscow. But neither did they opt entirely for the

³ The debates are discussed in Nicolas Spulber, *Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). On the collectivization, see Lionel Kochan, *The Making of Modern Russia* (Baltimore: Pelican, 1963), pp. 283–290; also Dobb, *op. cit.*, chapter 9.

* For the text of draft directives on the eighth five-year plan, see pp. 238 ff. of this issue.

Table 1: MAJOR ECONOMIC PLANS

“Plan for the Electrification of Russia” (Plan GOELRO), 1920–1921 (10 to 15 year horizon)
First Five-Year Plan (FYP), 1928–1929– 1932–1933 (refers to old Russian harvest years)
Second FYP, 1933–1937
Third FYP, 1938–1942 (interrupted by the “Great Patriotic War”)
Fourth FYP, 1946–1950
Fifth FYP, 1951–1955
Sixth FYP, 1956–1960 (abandoned in 1957)
The Seven-Year Plan, 1959–1965
The “Eighth” or “New” FYP, 1966–1970*

second alternative. What became known as Soviet planning was a mixture of (a) centralized policy-making with some direct interference in implementation; (b) some deliberate decentralizing levers to encourage managers and workers to fulfill their plans; and (c) some *de facto* decentralization of decisions, which afforded flexibility but also diluted the sought-after effectiveness of central control over the final outcome.

For all its faults—and many indeed have been pointed out over the years by Soviet as well as foreign analysts—the Soviet planning system did mobilize resources for a dramatic record of economic growth. Whether another system could or would have produced better results (with all other factors constant) must remain an academic question. The question of possible changes for the future is not so academic, however, as is amply illustrated by the current debates over planning reforms.

II

The decline in the Soviet rate of economic growth can be seen in Table 2, which presents some estimates of recent annual percentage increases in total and industrial output. The United States data emphasize the implications of the Soviet deceleration (and of the recent American acceleration) for the economic race which Soviet leaders are committed to winning. The narrower the gap

between the growth rates, the longer the time required for the U.S.S.R. to "overtake and surpass" the United States.

What can be said of the causes of the decline? In principle, all changes in the rate of growth ought to be ascribable to changes in the *quantities* of different inputs (labor, capital, natural resources, and so forth) and to changes in their *qualities*, or *productivities*. Unfortunately, the evidence on these factors still has not been sifted well enough to provide a conclusive answer.⁴ We can, however, turn to two specific areas—agriculture and industrial planning—for information that indirectly sheds light on the decline.

AGRICULTURE

In the apt phrase of Khrushchev's successor as head of the party, Leonid I. Brezhnev, Soviet agriculture has been "marking time" in recent years. Instead of the dramatic 70 per cent increase envisioned for the seven-year plan, total agricultural output experienced only a slightly rising trend of 10 per cent—aggravated by sharp year-to-year fluctuations. In particular, the failure of grain output to match expectations has caused bread, fodder and meat shortages.

⁴ The raw data are available in a series of documents published by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress: in chronological order, *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economics*, three volumes, 1960; *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, 1 volume with hearings, 1962; *Annual Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R.*, 1964; and *Current Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R.*, 1965; *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, five volumes, 1966.

⁵ See Sidney Ploss's interesting study, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-63* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

* Differs from American and other Western national income concepts chiefly in the exclusion of "unproductive" services: teachers' salaries, government expenses, health services, and so forth. Karl Marx (and Adam Smith) distinguished between *productive* activity (physical goods) and *unproductive* activity (services). Both sorts of activity, of course, entail the use of scarce resources; hence Western national income accountants include the output of services.

** Counts the value of a product every time it leaves a plant; e.g., a loaf of bread would get "double counted" at the grain elevator, the miller, the baker, and the packager as well as on the shelf. By contrast, the *value-added approach* counts only the *additional* resources used up at each stage of production.

Table 2:
RECENT GROWTH RATE ESTIMATES

a. Average annual percentage increase in Gross National Product (Western definition)	U.S.S.R.	U.S.
1951-1958	7.1	3.2
1959-1965	5.2	4.6
b. Average annual percentage increases in "National Income" (Soviet definition*)		
U.S.S.R.	U.S.	
1950-1958	10.9	2.5
1959-1964	7.0	4.5
c. Average annual percentage increases in Soviet industrial output:		
1. Gross output basis (Soviet definition**):		
1950-1958	12.0	
1956-1959	10.7	
1959-1964	9.2	
2. Value-added basis (Western definition):		
1956-1959	9.7	
1960-1963	7.0	

Sources:

- (a) Derived from private estimates by Holland Hunter, Haverford College; Professor Hunter is not responsible for the figures as used here.
- (b) *Narodnoe khoziaistvo v 1964 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1964: Statistical Annual) (Moscow, 1965), p. 88.
- (c) *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124; U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Current Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R.* (U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1965), p. 45.

The overall growth rate has been influenced in two ways by the lag in agricultural output. First, poor performance in a major sector of the economy (contributing 25 to 30 per cent of national income) has dragged down the average rate for the whole economy. Second, lagging supplies of raw materials, and the necessity to expend precious foreign exchange (itself cut by curtailed food exports) on imported food, have held back the growth of the industrial sector.

An idea of the causes of such poor performance can be gained from a look at Soviet agricultural policies since Stalin.⁵ As indicated previously, agriculture played a vital role in the early stages of industrialization. By the close of the fourth five-year plan in 1950, however, Soviet agriculture was showing signs of exhaustion. The reason: inadequate reimbursement with machinery,

fertilizer and other vital inputs for all the food, raw materials and labor pumped from agriculture to sustain industrial growth. It was time for a "new deal" for Russian agriculture.

Such a new deal was not then in the cards, however. At the death of Joseph V. Stalin in March, 1953, his successors disagreed in their evaluations of the true extent of the crisis in agriculture. Georgi M. Malenkov, who (as a close Stalin aide) bore great responsibility for the neglect underlying the crisis, attempted (unsuccessfully) to cover it over by drawing down emergency grain reserves. Others, such as Nikolai Bulganin, were too taken up with heavy industry to worry about agriculture. One man, Nikita S. Khrushchev, had tried in vain for several years to persuade Stalin of the deterioration of agriculture. After March, 1953, Khrushchev set about garnering support for an extensive agricultural program (to be staffed by his political "clients," of course). His failure to win such support then and throughout his tenure in office is a great irony of Soviet politics. One of his successors' first moves (discussed below) was to work out a by-then long overdue new deal, substantially along the lines advocated by Khrushchev for a decade and a half.

Khrushchev did manage, though, to sell his "Virgin Lands" Program. The key to this scheme was massive additional land inputs—some 30 million hectares (74 million acres) plowed up in three years in southern Russia, Kazakhstan and Siberia. The program's appeal lay in the substitution of the new lands for labor and capital inputs, which then did not have to be drawn away from industry. Also appealing was the organization of the new lands into state farms, ideologically preferable to the older peasant-household collectives because they employ wage-workers.

Khrushchev's virgin lands campaign drew fire both at home and abroad. Viewing the campaign after the fact, the criticism indeed appeared justified. Initial success in raising output, culminating in the bumper crop of 1958, gave way to a record that was at best

Table 3: SOVIET GRAIN HARVESTS AND STATE PROCUREMENTS

(Millions of metric tons; 1 m. ton = 2,204.6 lbs.)

	<i>Harvests</i>		<i>State Procurements</i>	
	Total	Virgin Lands	Total	Virgin Lands
1953	82.5	27.1	31.1	10.9
1954	85.6	37.6	34.6	17.8
1955	106.8	28.0	36.9	11.3
1956	127.6	63.6	54.1	36.8
1957	105.0	38.5	35.4	17.0
1958	141.2	58.8	56.9	32.8
1959	125.9	55.3	46.6	27.9
1960	134.4	59.1	46.7	29.1
1961	138.0	51.3	52.1	23.8
1962	148.2	56.4	56.6	27.1
1963	110.7	37.9	44.8	16.3
1964	160	87	68.3	37.5

Sources: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1960: Statistical Annual) (Moscow, 1961); *ibid.*, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964.

mediocre, at worst disastrous (see Table 3). In addition, resources were diverted from other agricultural regions, no doubt causing substandard performances there; and in many virgin land areas, "dust bowl" conditions arose from poor soil management mixed with drought.

Yet waiving the advantages of hindsight, in the perspective of the early 1950's the virgin lands program seemed less poorly chosen. The near-crisis state of agriculture in 1953 demanded that something be done, on pain of facing bread riots or importing large quantities of food. In light of this and the political opposition to a full-scale assault on agriculture, the campaign was not a "hare-brained scheme" but an ingenious stopgap measure designed to rescue a desperate grain situation, at least temporarily, at what promised to be quite low cost.

Then what happened, it may be asked, to turn a sound idea in prospect into a hare-brained scheme in retrospect? Besides the poor soil management already mentioned, inadequate attention was paid to adapting existing techniques to the particular conditions encountered in the virgin lands. For

example, seed types and fertilizers suited to semi-arid climates were not made available. Lack of proper adaptation heightened the sensitivity of the crops to variations in the weather, with grave consequences (as in 1963). But we should recall here that such adaptation would have entailed large-scale outlays—and the attraction of the virgin lands scheme in the first place was precisely the possibility it afforded of avoiding such outlays.

The problems of the virgin lands are in many respects a caricature of Soviet agricultural problems as a whole. Soviet agricultural policy over the years can with little exaggeration be summed up as an attempt to obtain production "on the cheap." This policy worked initially. It could also be salvaged for a few extra years by the virgin lands program. But ultimately it had to be reconsidered in the face of stagnating agricultural output.

Secretary Brezhnev chose the March, 1965, plenum of the party central committee to outline the "new" approach to agriculture. First of all, state procurement policy is to be drastically overhauled in favor of the farmers: planned procurements will be reduced and stabilized for a six-year period, and will be bought at higher base prices; and the farms will be able to sell above-plan output to the state at prices 50 per cent higher than the procurement prices.

Second, the "material-technical base" of agriculture is to be enhanced: capital investments financed from the government budget will total 71 billion rubles in 1966–1970—a 100 per cent increase over 1961–1965; larger numbers of specialists and technicians, plus better repair facilities, will accompany greater quantities of machinery provided on easier financial terms; and government programs of agricultural research and training will be significantly expanded.

Third, collective farms are to be treated more nearly equally on taxes, electric rates,

and so forth, as compared with the state farms. More generally, the collective farm has been reaffirmed as playing a vital role in "building the material-technical basis of communism," in sharp contrast to past pressures to convert the collectives into state farms.

Finally, the virgin lands program will remain in effect, as a good idea that now needs further "consolidation and development."

The 23d party congress reaffirmed the above program in its entirety, and added an ambitious plan to reclaim, lime or irrigate an additional 46 million hectares (114 million acres or 20–25 per cent of present total sown area) of substandard land. The new five-year plan goal for agricultural output, announced by Premier Kosygin at the congress, is a modest 25 per cent increase in the average annual output over the 1961–1965 level (which includes two bad harvests, 1963 and 1965). This goal should be realized if even a large portion of the above proposals is effected. The modest size of the goal suggests that one dose of resources in five short years will not suffice, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership, to restore a long-neglected agricultural sector to full health. Hence we should probably look for additional heavy commitments to agriculture beyond 1970.

PLANNING

In simplest terms, the problems of Soviet planning today lie in the fact that the old system has outgrown itself: put together originally to support rapid industrialization (as outlined above), it has not adapted well to the intricate tasks of efficiently operating the massive industrial base which it helped to create. In the words of the draft directives of the new five-year plan,

... in the past few years a disparity has formed between the sharply rising scale of production and the methods of planning and economic management and the system of material incentives that were in effect. . . .⁶

The relative simplicity of goals during the first generation of Soviet growth—production of steel to build more steel mills—made crash programs aimed at bottleneck sectors an effec-

⁶ *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, February 20, 1966; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (C.D.S.P.), Vol. XVIII, No. 7 (March 9, 1966), p. 4.

tive means of achieving rapid growth. Industrial success, however, brought with it the necessity to keep track of ever larger numbers and varieties of products: now "more steel" had to be broken down into a myriad of specifications to suit a myriad of users. The number of potential (and actual) bottlenecks increased; single-minded *shturmovshchini* (storming campaigns) could no longer be created fast enough to deal with them all. As a result, actual economic results diverged sharply from the planners' intentions.

The Soviet press has always been full of criticisms of this or that aspect of the planning system. In the late 1950's, however, the locus of the criticisms began to shift from superficial treatments of isolated cases ("we must improve the planning of . . .") to more basic, analytical discussions questioning the fundamental premises of the system. This shift coincided with the reemergence of the Soviet economics profession from an intellectual limbo dating back to the start of industrialization. The combination produced a full-fledged debate on the purposes, principles and methods of planning which is still going on.

Two principal schools of thought, which parallel the alternatives suggested in Part I above, stand out in the discussions. One holds that the exploitation of advancing computer technology to gather, process and analyze mountains of data would provide effective, centralized planning control, and avoid the undesirable, *de facto* kind of decentralization. The other school, led most notably by Professor Evsei G. Liberman of Kharkov University, does not deny the desirability of using computers to solve large-scale quantitative economic problems. But its followers are skeptical that computer technology can keep pace with the demands that would be placed on it by an attempt to centralize all planning details. Instead they would rely on incentives that persuade lower-level de-

cision-makers to adopt policies coinciding with the planners' intentions.

The actual planning reforms announced at the September, 1965, central committee plenum and reaffirmed at the 23d party congress, are heavily oriented towards the second, Libermanesque school of thought. The goal of the reform has been summarized by Liberman himself:⁷

. . . to develop a system of planning and assessing the work of enterprises so that they will be vitally interested in the highest possible targets, in introducing new machinery and improving the quality of output, in a word, in the highest efficiency of production.

The quotation diagnoses what is primarily wrong with the present planning system. The chief standard against which the performance of an industrial enterprise has been measured is the total (or "gross") value of output. This indicator has been supplemented with a multitude of secondary (and often inconsistent) ones—cost reduction, innovations, labor plans—but the thirst for just plain more output has guaranteed the preeminence of gross output targets as the main success criterion. Paraphrasing Mr. Micawber—50 kopecks over the plan, happiness; 50 kopecks under, misery.

The results are predictable: a lower target is more easily fulfilled; new techniques disrupt the production line, causing output to decline; and inferior goods are more easily produced than superior ones. Moreover, the use of gross output targets encourages an enterprise to use the most, not the least, costly inputs, since purchase costs are counted in gross output. Finally, buying firms have little control over selling firms in refusing sub-standard or incorrectly specified goods.

Liberman's proposal substitutes "profitability"—calculated as revenues minus costs, divided by the firm's capital—for gross output as the principal standard of performance. The firm now must sell its output to a willing buyer on a contract basis to earn revenues. It will want to strive to reduce, not pad, input costs. And it will be encouraged to economize on its capital, heretofore used wastefully because it was granted free to the enter-

⁷ *Pravda*, September 9, 1962; translated in *Problems of Economics*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (July, 1965), p. 3. A useful compilation of translations from the planning reform discussion is contained in *Problems of Economics* for June, July and August, 1965, and January, 1966.

prise from the state budget. Gross output target fulfillment will still be a secondary indicator, but a graduated scale of bonuses and retention of earnings will encourage firms to set higher rather than lower targets.

The implementation of the planning reforms will be gradual: it is estimated that only one-third of the industrial labor force will be employed in enterprises covered under the new scheme by the end of this year. A critical problem in the changeover is the nature of Soviet prices, which are notoriously unsound for economic purposes: a price of two rubles does not always represent twice as many resources as one ruble. But revenues and costs have to be measured in prices which represent the resources used, for the Liberman scheme to make sense. A two-year price reform is allegedly under way, but past price reforms do not give grounds for optimism. The question of prices is perhaps the single most dubious aspect of the new system of planning and management.

A note of caution: some foreign observers have read into the use of "profitability" a turn towards capitalism. However, the basic economic distinction between Soviet-style socialism and American capitalism concerns the ownership of property: nowhere in the Liberman plan is anything said about selling land and plant-and-equipment to individual Soviet citizens. Neither is it correct to see in the reforms an abandonment of central planning; on the contrary, the reforms are being undertaken to strengthen *effective* central economic control. (Both of these points have been made repeatedly by Professor Liberman and others, including a long letter to *Time Magazine* last year.)

III

The "eighth" or "new" five-year plan for

⁸ See footnote 6.

⁹ *Narodnoe knoziaistvo SSSR v 1964 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1964: Statistical Annual), (Moscow, 1965), p. 124.

¹⁰ The expression, "reluctant consumer," is Marshall Goldman's: "The Reluctant Consumer and Economic Fluctuations in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. LXXIII, No. 4 (August, 1965), pp. 366-380.

1966-1970 envisions increases of 47-50 per cent in all gross industrial output, and of 49-52 per cent in the gross output of "branches producing the means of production"—crucial for future growth.⁸ These percentages work out to annual averages of 8.0-8.5 per cent and 8.3-8.8 per cent respectively, substantially below those achieved even during the "slowdown" of 1959-1964: 9.2 per cent (see Table 2, part c.i.) and 10.4 per cent.⁹ Assuming that the proposed remedies for agriculture and industrial planning are successful, how can we account for such conservative industrial output targets?

Part of the answer may lie in two areas—consumption and defense (including space exploration)—which share the common feature of drawing resources away from uses productive of future growth.

CONSUMPTION

The privations of Soviet consumers were real enough in the early stages of industrialization: gross investment absorbed 20-25 per cent of gross national product (compared with 12-14 per cent for the United States recently) and defense expenditures took out an additional large chunk (see below). When plan cutbacks had to be made, Soviet planners consistently chose to trim consumer goods rather than producer goods and raw materials.

By the time of Stalin's death in 1953, however, Soviet consumers were ready for a break. In his "new course," Georgi Malenkov attempted to give them that break in the form of substantial increases in consumer durables. Although the "new course" never came to fruition, the point was not lost on Khrushchev, Bulganin and others—popular support could be won by paying more attention to consumer goods.

By the late 1950's, greater quantities of consumer goods had begun to come on the market, and Russian consumers responded eagerly—at first. But the "forgotten consumer's" first blush of demand for virtually *any* consumer goods faded in the early 1960s, and the era of the "reluctant consumer" dawned.¹⁰ Inventories grew as consumers

began saving more of their incomes; cartoons in the humor magazine, *Krokodil*, belittled the lack of quality and sensitivity to demand of consumer goods (large warehouse stock-piles of left shoes, for instance).

Soviet leaders responded by setting up research institutes in demand analysis and market forecasting. Soviet economists write of the problems of planning consumer goods—involving fads and fickle tastes—as the most challenging tasks the planning system has yet faced. To an older generation, these developments are a far cry from the ideals of the revolution, but surely, comes the reply, the revolution is not benefited from filling the warehouses with unsellable merchandise.

This is the setting for Premier Kosygin's report on consumer goods at the 23d party congress.¹¹ First, the consumer goods industries will grow by 43–46 per cent (or 7.4–7.9 per cent per annum on the average) over the five years 1966–1970, compared with 36 per cent for 1961–1965. More significant, these industries are to grow almost as rapidly as the old favorite, heavy industry, whereas in the past the latter always outpaced the former (in 1961–1965, by 9.6 per cent to 6.4 per cent per annum.) Also promised were higher quality and greater variety. Is this Walt Rostow's stage of "high mass consumption?" Probably not yet, but major steps towards it appear in the offing.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

We can consider expenditures on defense and space exploration together, since both have military and other implications for international relations, and they require similar kinds of inputs (advanced scientists, special materials and equipment, booster

¹¹ *Prauda* and *Izvestia*, April 5, 1966; translated in C.D.S.P., Vol. XVIII, No. 14 (April 27, 1966), pp. 6–7 and 10.

¹² L. C. Bloomfield, W. C. Clemens, and F. Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), *passim*, especially chapters 3, 7 and 17.

¹³ J. G. Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet Military Establishment," in Joint Economic Committee, *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–46; also, Abraham Becker, *Soviet Military Outlays since 1955*, RAND Corporation memorandum RM-3886-PR, July, 1964.

rockets), especially as the "nuclear age" of military technology advances. Thus hereafter "defense" should be taken to mean "defense and space."

The possibility of increased defense spending poses perhaps the gravest threat to enhanced consumption in the immediate future. Premier Kosygin intimated as much at the 23d congress in discussing Soviet aid to North Vietnam. Discounting the propaganda content of his statement, it would not be out of line with past experience if extra military outlays came at the expense of consumer, not producer goods.

The relative likelihood of a new Soviet arms buildup over Vietnam is outside the scope of this article. There is evidence that the present level of defense spending does not severely strain the Soviet economy.¹² Yet in a very real sense any defense spending at all involves a "burden" which is not fully offset by such civilian byproducts as radar, heat-resistant baking dishes and weather information.

The burden of Soviet defense spending has three important economic aspects. First, overall size in relation to national income. Budgeted defense spending has been running on the order of 7–8 per cent of the "national income" (Soviet definition). Two difficulties arise: Soviet "national income" does not adequately reflect resource utilization (see Table 2), and not all defense expenditures are included in the budget item bearing that name. Several Americans have attempted to estimate the true total of Soviet defense outlays.¹³ Taking some liberties (for

(Continued on page 240)

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As this scientist evaluates Russian space technology, "No other country except the United States has been able to meet the challenge flung by the flight of the first Sputnik. At present, the two great world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are running a keen race in the field of space science and technology."

The Soviet Space Effort

By JOHN TURKEVICH

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THE SOVIET SPACE ACCOMPLISHMENT represents one of the outstanding scientific and technological achievements of the middle of the twentieth century. The flight of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957, ushered in the space age and confirmed the position of the Soviet Union as a major world power. The military importance of space flight was quickly realized. The power of rockets that could send satellites into space could also hurl warheads to any location on the earth. The precision attained on hitting the moon could also be used to hit any target on this planet. Surveillance and detection could be carried out reliably from satellite observation posts. These apparent applications could be extrapolated into the future to visualize space platforms for launching bombs, or space battles between satellites.

It would be difficult to assess the present status and to foresee future developments in the Soviet space effort without appreciation of its past. What were the historical factors that made for the present successes of the Soviet Union?

The historical background has three sources: the work accomplished prior to World War II in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union; the German scientific accomplishment during World War II; and, finally, the work carried on after World War II in the Soviet Union, partially with German help. Three main divisions of scientific and technolo-

logical work are associated with these accomplishments: flight of heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air machines; the use of rockets for fire displays and weapon propulsion; and, finally, the development of schemes for flight from the earth to space and from space back to earth.

The importance of any one person to the overall development of space research and technology is difficult to assess. Ideas not reduced to practice must be discounted, particularly if they were presented in such obscure journals that they did not influence the further development of science and technology. It is in this light that we must consider many of the chauvinistic claims of Soviet propagandists for priority in space science.

EARLY RUSSIAN FLIGHTS

The first balloon in Russia went up in June, 1804, in St. Petersburg, about 25 years after the first successful lighter-than-air flight of the Montgolfier brothers in France. After that time there was continued interest in Russia in lighter-than-air flights. Thus the great Russian chemist, Dimitri Mendeleev, became interested in balloons in 1875, and in 1888 went up over 16,000 feet to watch an eclipse of the sun. There have been periodic claims by Soviet propagandists that Aleksander Mozhaiski constructed a heavier-than-air machine and made a flight in it near St. Petersburg in 1882, several decades before the

flight of the Wright brothers. However, the Soviet claims for the priority of the Mozhaiski flight have not been substantiated by evidence convincing to experts in the West or to some experts in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, by 1880 there were enough flying enthusiasts in Russia to organize the Russian Society for Air Navigation and to publish Russia's first aviation magazine, *Air Navigator* (*Vozdukhoplavatel*). The academic aspects of aerodynamics were ably represented by such outstanding theoreticians as N. E. Zhukovski (1847–1921), who trained many of the present leaders in Soviet aviation and space science.

During World War I, Russian aviation was sufficiently advanced to have observation planes. The high degree of development of aviation in Imperial Russia is attested by the important contributions made to American aviation by Igor Sikorski, Major de Severski, and other White Russian emigrés. In the period between the two World Wars, aviation research and training were carried out at TSAGI, the Zukovski Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute in Moscow. This is still one of the outstanding centers for aerodynamic research. Soviet aviation during this period made world news with spectacular flights to the Arctic and long-distance flights to the United States.

During World War II, Soviet aviation specialized in *Sturmoviks*, fighter planes that gave effective support to Russian ground troops. In the period after World War II, Soviet civil aviation depended on DC-3 planes, either furnished by or copied from the Americans. However, intensive work was carried out on jet propulsion for both military and civilian use. Thus, the Soviet Union was the first country to introduce giant jet planes for civilian transportation. Soviet astronauts received their preliminary training as jet pilots. The training place for astronauts and jet pilots is located east of the Sea of Aral in west central Asia.

The historical background for Soviet rocketry goes back to the eighteenth century, when Russians illuminated their festivals with displays of fireworks. During the imperial

regime, fireworks were the medium of expression of joy in the event of national victories, just as they are under the Soviet regime. The Rocket Works (*Raketnoye Zavedenie*) was established in 1680 in Moscow and transferred to the new capital of St. Petersburg by Peter the Great. Over the years, research and development was carried out at the Rocket Works. General Aleksander Zasiadko (1779–1837) developed rocketry as a supplement to Russian artillery. Combat rockets were used by the Russians in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829, in the conquest of Caucasus, and in the Crimean War. Konstantin Konstantinov (1819–1871), chief of the Rocket Works, built a ballistic pendulum which permitted successful evaluation of rocket performance. This device assured the standardization and mechanization of rocket manufacture. His lectures on "War Rockets" at the Mikhailovskoye Artillery College were published as a book in 1861 in France.

During World War II, the Soviets developed a rocket artillery which was very effective in stopping the German ground attack.

THE FATHER OF THE SPACE AGE

The father of the Russian space age is Konstantin Eduordovich Tsiolkovski (1857–1935). A son of a Polish forester in the village of Izhevskoye in the province of Ryazan near Moscow, he lost his hearing at the age of nine as a consequence of a severe case of scarlet fever, which forced him to leave school and to educate himself from the books in his father's library. He became interested in balloons and flying machines at a very early age. He spent three years of study in Moscow and in 1879 passed an examination and became a people's school teacher. He was assigned to teach arithmetic, geometry and physics at the Borovskoye district, Kaluga province, 45 miles southwest of Moscow. Here he wrote papers on scientific subjects and carried out chemical experiments on propulsion and constructed flying machines.

Tsiolkovski was particularly interested in an all-metal dirigible, in a stream-lined flying machine and in use of rockets for interplanetary flight. In 1892, he became a high school

teacher in Kaluga, a provincial capital 90 miles southwest of Moscow. In 1897, he built a wind tunnel for testing out his design models. About this time he received modest recognition from the scientific community. In 1900, he was awarded a grant of 470 roubles from the Imperial Academy of Sciences and in 1900, 500 roubles from a public subscription sponsored by a newspaper.

In 1903, Tsiolkovski published *Investigations of World Space by Rocket Devices*. In this book, he presented the theory of rocket flight and the scientific basis for the use of rockets for interplanetary communication. In 1929, he designed a multistage rocket similar to one Robert Goddard had developed in the United States 15 years earlier. Tsiolkovski also proposed a variety of liquid fuel propellants: liquid oxygen on the one hand and kerosene, or methane, or alcohol, or liquid hydrogen on the other hand. He suggested the use of liquid fuels as coolants for the combustion chamber of jets and studied the problem of the reentry of space craft into the earth's atmosphere.

The Soviet government recognized Tsiolkovski's scientific contribution by granting him a subsidy and conferring on him the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. During the 1935 May Day celebrations he spoke over the radio to the parade marchers assembled in Red Square, predicting that interstellar ships would soon rise from the Russian steppes. He died on September 19, 1935, and has remained the hero and the inspiration of the Soviet space effort.

After World I, two groups were organized to develop the ideas of Tsiolkovski—the Society for Interplanetary Communication (1924) and the groups for the Study of Rocket Motion in Moscow and in Leningrad (in the 1930's). During this period, a leader in Soviet rocket research was the Latvian, Fredrich Tsander (1887-1959). After his studies at the Riga Polytechnical Institute, Tsander became interested in Tsiolkovski's work and designed planes and rocket engines. In the 1920's he lectured about interplanetary travel all over the Soviet Union and impressed Lenin with his ideas at a meeting of

Russian inventors. In 1928-1930, he built a liquid oxygen-kerosene rocket engine. About 1934, the Soviet government began to give serious support to the rocket program and established a research center in the Moscow suburbs. Test stand firings were carried out using rockets with liquid propellants. V. P. Glushko (1908-) designed a rocket engine with a thrust of 651 pounds. The liquid propellant program was discontinued during World War II and emphasis was placed on solid propellants for artillery rockets. The rocket testing site was then transferred from Moscow to Sverdlovsk in the Urals.

GERMAN AID

After the end of World War II, Soviet interest in rocket development was revived by the spectacular successes of the German V-2 missiles, the capture of the German rocket base at Peenemünde and by the possibility of coupling nuclear warheads with long-range rockets. The Red army obtained a number of V-2 rockets, blueprints, parts, tools and manufacturing facilities so that the Soviet rocket experts could continue liquid propellant work at the point where the Germans made it practical.

The Soviet security forces also captured a large number of German scientists and technicians who served as instructors in rocket technology to the Russians. The Germans captured by the Russians were not designers and administrators but were mostly the hardware men involved in the details of missile manufacture. A number of specialists were also captured, such as Wilhelm Fischer, a guidance and navigation expert, and Helmut Grottrup, the executive assistant to the director of the Peenemünde establishment. The Germans helped the Russians design an IRBM (the intermediate range ballistic missile), with a range of 2,000 miles, which became operational in 1957.

The German scientists and technicians worked at a number of centers—at Khimki, a suburb of Moscow, at an island on a lake 200 miles northwest of Moscow; at the rocket proving grounds 150 miles east of Stalingrad;

and at the rocket motor station at Kuibushev. The Germans were essential in giving the Russians a head start. Most of them completed their work for the Russians by 1954 and after four years were allowed to return to Germany.

The coordinator of the work of the Germans in Russia was the leading Soviet administrator, D. F. Ustinov, who in 1943-1953 was the minister of armament and from 1953 to 1957 was the minister of the armament industry. He is one of the first deputy prime ministers of the Soviet Union. It must be emphasized that it was the Soviets who carried out the major leap forward into space from a platform built by both Russian and German space scientists.

SOVIET SCIENTISTS

The organization of the Soviet space effort and the role of the individual scientists involved in it has been shrouded in secrecy. The state committee for defense technology under Leonid A. Smirnov, a deputy premier, seems to have the overall responsibility at the ministerial level. Direct supervision of the military aspects of the program is in the hands of the army, which on numerous occasions has shown itself to be the most efficient organization in the Soviet Union, replacing, for "crash projects," the secret police organization of the Stalin era. The U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, with its research institutes, furnishes scientific support to the space enterprise.

A number of prominent Russian scientists have been associated with the Soviet space effort. Peter L. Raptisa, world renowned for his low temperature work, who had attained scientific prominence before World War II in England and had been forceably retained in the Soviet Union, contributed his knowledge of the manufacture and handling of liquid oxygen so necessary as an oxidizer for rocket fuel. Nicholas N. Semenov, who received the Nobel prize for his work on flames, combustion and explosions, undoubtedly helped to develop proper combustion conditions inside rocket engines. Mstislav V. Keldysh, the president of the U.S.S.R. Acad-

emy of Sciences, established his scientific reputation on methods of stabilizing flight of planes in air and objects in space. Leonid I. Sedov has represented the Soviet Union at international discussions on space flight. He is an expert in aerodynamics, shock waves and astrophysics and, in 1959, served as president of the International Federation of Astronautics.

Some of the secrecy associated with space work in the Soviet Union seems to be lifted at the death of an important personality associated with it. Thus the West did not learn about Sergei P. Korolev, the chief designer of the space vehicle, until his death from cancer on January 15, 1966. Born in 1907 in Zhitomir in the Ukraine, a son of a school teacher, Korolev started his technical training in an aircraft plant. In 1930, he graduated from the Bauman Technical Institute, the Soviet M.I.T., and three years later joined the Moscow rocket group as an aircraft engineer. In 1934, he took part in a conference on the study of the stratosphere and published a book entitled *Rocket Flight in the Stratosphere*. In 1940, he designed a tailless rocket glider. During his lifetime he received academic recognition by election to the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in 1953 as corresponding member and in 1958 as an academician. On his death, he was acclaimed by the Soviet leadership as the designer of the Sputnik and Lunik satellites and of the space vehicles Vostok and Voshod.

ACHIEVEMENTS IN SPACE

Soviet accomplishments in space exploration are manifold and include unmanned space flights around the earth, manned space flights around the earth, flights toward the moon, flights toward the other planets of the solar system, exploration with radio signaling, and space medicine. In 1957, the Soviets placed 3 earth satellites into orbit; in 1958, 3; in 1959, none; in 1960, 3; in 1961, 2; in 1962, 12 of the Cosmos series; in 1963, 12 of the Cosmos series and one of the Polet series; in 1964, 27 of the Cosmos series, 1 of the Polet series and 4 of the Elektron series; in 1965, 50 of the Cosmos series. It should be noted

that there were 2 launchings, each of which placed 3 Cosmos satellites into orbit, and 3 launchings, each of which put 5 Cosmos satellites into orbit. Also, in 1965, two communication satellites, Molniya 1 and Molniya 2, were placed into orbit. In 1966, the heaviest space station—11,800 kilograms—was sent up as a cosmic ray laboratory.

SPUTNIKS

The Soviets were the first to send a satellite—Sputnik I—around the earth, on October 4, 1957. The orbit of Sputnik I had a perigee of 228 kilometers and an apogee of 947 kilometers.¹

Sputnik I (weight, 84 kilograms) measured the functional drag of the atmosphere on the satellite, a measurement used to calculate the density of the atmosphere at the altitudes through which the satellite travelled. It studied the ionosphere—the layer of charged particles around the earth important for radio communication. It determined the cycle of temperature changes that the satellite underwent. The data obtained with Sputnik I was used to determine the optimal values for the flight parameters of the rocket.

Sputnik II (November 3, 1957, 508 kilograms) determined the intensity of cosmic rays and its variation with time. It studied the ultra-violet and X-radiation of the sun. It also carried out the first biological experiment in space. Measurements were made during flight of the pulse, breathing rate, blood pressure and the biopotential of the first living passenger in space, the dog, Leika. The systems for air conditioning, heat regulation, and feeding of living organisms during flight were checked out on Sputnik II.²

Sputnik III (May 15, 1958, 1,327 kilograms in weight) was the first satellite to use

semi-conductor solar batteries as a power source. The data it transmitted permitted determination of the pressure and the composition of the atmosphere, the concentration of positive ions, the magnitude of the electric charge picked up by the satellite during flight, the intensity of the corpuscular radiation from the sun, the intensity of the earth's magnetic field, the composition and variation of primary cosmic radiation, and the number and composition of meteorites.

The Soviet Cosmos series began on March 16, 1962, and by August, 1966, 137 satellites of this series had been placed into orbit. The general objective of this series is the study of the upper layers of the atmosphere. In particular, during long periods of flight a thorough examination is being carried out on the effect of radiation on living organisms and on the damage caused to the satellites by collisions with meteorites. Observations are also made on the formation of cloud systems and their distribution in the earth's atmosphere.

The Electron series represents the orbiting of two satellites into two different orbits by means of one single stage rocket. Both satellites have a highly asymmetric orbit with a perigee of 400 and 460 kilometers and an apogee of 7,000 and 67,000 kilometers. The purpose of the satellites of the Elektron series is to measure simultaneously the internal and external radiation belts surrounding us.

The Polet series consists of satellites which can be maneuvered in flight. After placement in orbit, their height, lateral positions and angle of flight can be changed at command from the earth. Ready maneuverability in all directions will permit solution of complicated problems of meeting and joining together of objects in space and thus facilitate the construction of heavy cosmic vehicles for manned flight to the moon, to Mars and other planets of the solar system. In one Polet flight, the apogee was changed from 592 to 1437 kilometers.

The satellites of the Molniya series are launched for communication purposes. They are equipped with rockets that are available for a periodic correction of the orbit to take

¹ The perigee is the closest distance of the orbit to the earth while the apogee is the greatest distance from the earth.

² The first American satellite Explorer 1 (January 31, 1958, 14 kilograms) investigated the flux of micrometeorites, the intensity of cosmic rays, the propagation of radiowaves in the ionosphere, the magnetic fields of the earth and the moon, and the density of the upper layers of the earth's atmosphere. The Explorer 1 discovered the important radiation regions around the earth, the "Van Allen" belts.

care of the changes caused in the orbit by the gravitational field of the earth, sun and moon. The apogee of Molniya 1 was 39,380 kilometers while the perigee was 500 kilometers. The original period of rotation was 11 hours and 48 minutes. This was corrected to 12 hours.

MANNED FLIGHTS

The Soviets have carried out a number of spectacular manned flights into space. The solo flights were in the Vostok series, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, which had a perigee of 180 kilometers and an apogee of 230 kilometers. The apogee of the Vostok 1 was greater, being 324 kilometers. In this first manned flight on April 12, 1961, Yuri A. Gagarin flew around the world in one hour and forty-eight minutes. On August 6 of the same year, G. S. Titiov made 17 flights around the earth in 25 hours. On August 12 of the following year, the Russians placed two space vehicles into orbit—one manned by A. G. Nikolaev and another by P. R. Popovich. The two ships established communication with each other in space. The next pair of space ships was placed in orbit on June 14 and 16, 1963, one flown by V. F. Bykovski, the other, by the first woman cosmonaut, V. V. Tereshkova. The two ships met in space. Bykovski remained in orbit almost five days and nights.

The first of the two Voskhod flights took place on October 12, 1964, and had three passengers: a flier, V. M. Komarov, a scientist, K. P. Feoktistov, and a physician, B. B. Egorov. The three occupants of the space ship wore no special clothing, nor was the space ship equipped with catapulting devices to eject the passengers in case of emergency. These simplifications in the construction of the space vehicle indicated the confidence of the Soviet space technologists in the reliability of the capsule's air conditioning and of the launching mechanism of the rocket that put the capsule into orbit. The flight of the Voskhod 1 lasted about 24 hours and it made a soft landing on the earth. Voskhod 2 had two passengers, P. I. Belyev and A. A. Leonov. The latter left the ship in his space suit and remained in space for ten minutes.

The total time of the flight was 26 hours in an orbit of slightly greater apogee (495 kilometers) than the previous Voskhod 1 (409 kilometers). The perigee of both vehicles was the same at 173 kilometers.

By the end of July, 1966, the Soviets had made 8 manned flights; the United States made 14; in the multimanned flights the number favored the Americans, 8 to 2. The total number of hours of man in space was 1,661 for the United States and 507 for the U.S.S.R. There had been 20 Americans in space and 11 Russians. Three Americans took space walks of 2 hours and 56 minutes while only one Russian made a space walk of 10 minutes. The United States has had 7 rendezvous in space, 8 maneuverable space ships and has twice linked 2 vehicles in space. The Soviets have yet to carry out a linking in space of two vehicles. The American Gemini 10 craft probed deeper into space (750 kilometers) with human passengers on board than any Soviet craft (495 kilometers).

MOON EXPLORATION

Landing a man on the moon has been a prime objective in the space exploration of both the United States and the Soviet Union. At present, the Russians seem to have the jump on the Americans in this race, though the United States is catching up rapidly. This has been particularly apparent with the recent successful Surveyer 1 shot, which made a soft landing on the moon and revealed important details about the moon's surface.

Luna 1 (January 2, 1959) was the first man-projected device to overcome the earth's gravitational field and to travel toward the moon. It missed hitting the moon by about 5,000 miles and became the sun's first man-made satellite. Luna 2 (September 12, 1959) made a hard landing on the moon, the first physical contact made by man. Luna 3 (October 4, 1959) photographed the hidden side of the moon. The photographs that were radioed back to the earth revealed for the first time topographic details of that side of the moon which had never been seen by man. Luna 4 (April 14, 1963) missed the moon. Luna 5 (May 12, 1965), pro-

jected by a rocket from an earth satellite, crashed into the "Sea of Clouds" on the moon. Luna 6 (June 8, 1965) missed the moon by 150,000 kilometers. Luna 7 made a hard landing on the moon on October 5, 1965.

The first successful soft landing on the moon was achieved by Luna 8, on December 7, 1965. Close-up pictures of the moon's surface were obtained and transmitted back to the earth. Luna 9 made a hard landing in the "Ocean of Storms" on January 31, 1966. On March 31, Luna 10 was placed into orbit around the moon. Its apogee with respect to the moon is 620 kilometers and its perigee is 220 kilometers. It transmitted information about the hidden side of the moon.

American activity in the exploration of the moon has also been intense. Vehicles of the Ranger series 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 passed the moon or made hard landings on the moon. On June 2, 1966, Surveyor 1 made a soft landing on the moon and transmitted precise and highly detailed information about the lunar surface. This data is particularly important in determining whether the surface of the moon can support the weight of a vehicle and an astronaut.

FLIGHTS TOWARD OTHER PLANETS

Space vehicles have been directed toward Venus and Mars by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union made two unsuccessful flights in 1961, three unsuccessful in 1962, one unsuccessful in 1964, and one unsuccessful and two successful flights in 1965. The Soviet Union has hit Venus with one of its vehicles. The United States has made only two flights to Venus, both in 1964, one unsuccessful and another (Mariner 6) highly successful.

The Soviet flights to Mars started with two unsuccessful attempts in 1960, and two unsuccessful and three successful flights in 1962. In 1964, the Soviets made one unsuccessful and one successful flight. The United States started its flights to Mars in 1964, with one successful and one unsuccessful flight. The successful Mariner radioed back close-up photographs of this planet.

RADIO EXPLORATION OF SPACE

Electronics and radioengineering have been strong in the Soviet Union for decades. Radioastronomy has been used to investigate space objects (stars and nebulae) which give off radiowaves. Radiotelescopes, the powerful instruments of radioastronomy, have given us a better understanding of the universe—the birth and destruction of stars and the galaxies. They have discovered unusually powerful sources of radiowaves—the supernovae whose brilliance is thousands of billions times greater than that of the sun. The Soviet Union has a number of large installations of radiotelescopes. In the period 1961–1964, a group of Soviet physicists utilized radar techniques to study the planets Mercury, Venus, Mars and Jupiter. Radar investigation of Venus, whose surface is hidden from optical astronomical investigation, has disclosed that its surface is not a continuous ocean of clouds but has a considerable area of exposed mountains. The day on Venus has been found to be 200 to 800 times longer than the day on the earth. The Soviets, like the Americans, have also bounced a laser beam off the moon.

SPACE MEDICINE

The Soviets have made significant contributions to space medicine. Their preliminary experiments were carried out with animals propelled by the captured German V-2 rockets. In the early Sputnik series, seven dogs went on various space flights. The internal construction of the space capsule was checked out and the living conditions in it were monitored during flight. The reliability of the launching and reentry systems was tested. Radio telemetering of medical information about living organisms in space was

(Continued on page 241)

John Turkevich is the author of *Chemistry in the Soviet Union* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965) and *Soviet Men of Science* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963) and was formerly science attaché at the American Embassy in Moscow.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE SOVIET UNION

THE COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATUS. By ABDURAKHMAN AVTORKHANOV. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966. 376 pages, appendix and index, \$10.00.)

THE NEW CLASS DIVIDED. By ALBERT PARRY. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. 316 pages and index, \$8.95.)

These two books provide a startling illustration of just how diversely the contemporary Soviet political scene may be interpreted. Mr. Avtorkhanov, focusing on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and drawing upon both his prewar experiences as a member of that party and the published record, concludes that a unique political system has been created in the U.S.S.R., which he calls "partocracy." In his view, the organizational solidarity of Soviet partocracy is capable of perpetuating monolithic party rule indefinitely. Indeed, Mr. Avtorkhanov recognizes no significant changes in the structure of Soviet power since the death of Joseph Stalin and suggests that the system is quite capable of surviving the death of its leaders.

Dr. Parry, on the other hand, focuses upon those forces in Soviet society which challenge the authority of the party. His thesis is that the party is becoming increasingly unable to dominate a new socio-economic class which its rule has created and upon which the dynamic development of Soviet society now depends—the technological intelligentsia. He notes the growing security and material well-being of this class, deriving from the key role it now plays. "It is this possession of economic assets," he writes, "that makes the professional elite no longer the party's helot, but actually a countervailing force—and potentially a competitor of the party, a contender for control of the nation. . . ." His book seeks to demonstrate that in a variety

of important fields, from genetics to military science, and even education, the party is no longer able to enforce unthinking discipline upon men who consider themselves intellectually above the party. The result, he feels, is a tension which will ultimately greatly reduce the stature and influence of the party.

These two interpretations obviously stand in sharp contradiction. In this writer's opinion, Dr. Parry's somewhat impressionistic study is much closer to the Soviet reality today than Mr. Avtorkhanov's rather rigid approach. The latter will give the reader considerable data about the party and its inner workings, but will throw little light upon the dynamics of the party's relationship to Soviet society.

Stephen S. Anderson
Marlboro College

SOVIET STRATEGIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

By CHARLES B. McLANE.

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. 483 pages, biographies, chronology, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

At a time when the attention of all Americans is increasingly focused on Vietnam and the problems of great-power involvement there, the appearance of a new and definitive study of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia is particularly welcome. Professor McLane's book deals only with the eras of Lenin and Stalin, but is nonetheless extremely useful for placing current Soviet policies—and dilemmas—in perspective.

One of the key points which emerges from this excellent and detailed study is the gap between doctrine and action in past Soviet policy toward this area. The author shows conclusively that during most of the period from 1917 to 1953 Soviet pronouncements on Southeast Asian affairs were not

matched by deep operational involvement there. There was never any genuine effort to organize a coordinated revolutionary apparatus for all of Southeast Asia, and Soviet policy for the most part was limited to advising local Communist parties—often belatedly—as to the current "line." Professor McLane attributes this not only to distance and scarcity of Soviet resources, but also to Stalin's failure to grasp the potential importance of the area to the U.S.S.R. This was a defect which Stalin's successors are still trying to remedy.

Anyone interested in the roots of contemporary Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia will find this book timely and useful.

S.S.A.

THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM. By ALFRED G. MEYER. (New York: Random House, 1965. 480 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

Best known heretofore for his outstanding studies of Marxism and Leninism, Professor Meyer has now produced a major new book on the Soviet political system. It is intended to serve not only as a basic descriptive text on this subject, but also as a new interpretation which departs somewhat from customary patterns.

That "the USSR can best be understood as modern bureaucracy writ large" is the stated central theme of this book. Its author finds strong similarities, both in value and in method, between the giant "private" bureaucratic corporate structures found in modern Western societies and the super-bureaucracy which is the Soviet system. He develops the familiar data—party structure, the state, the various areas of Soviet policy—around this theme in a thoughtful and provocative manner. Frequent comparisons with experiences with which most American readers will be familiar make the book particularly effective in placing the Soviet system in perspective and rendering it less distant and mysterious.

Nonetheless, two matters troubled this reviewer. First, although the assertion is

made near the end of the book that "industrial society . . . has a structuring effect on political or social life, which in the long run is bound to be stronger than political culture, history, and ideology," one searches in vain for adequate substantiation of this point in the book itself. Second, the final chapter, which deals with the problem of evaluation, is far too superficial for such an important subject. These reservations aside, however, the book is an important new interpretation and a useful addition to the literature on Soviet politics.

S.S.A.

CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING IN SOVIET RUSSIA: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963. By SIDNEY PLOSS (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 312 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.50.)

The importance of this book stems from the fact that it restores "politics" to the study of Soviet government and policy-making. The author discards the view that the sharing of a common ideology "inhibits the emergence of narrow, specialized interests" among the top Soviet leaders. Further, Professor Ploss demonstrates that, through a close and careful textual analysis of Soviet periodicals, publications and speeches, "issues and leadership alignments can be reasonably established."

Adopting a case study approach to the formulation of agricultural policy in the decade after Stalin's death, he painstakingly traces the policy disputes, personal rivalries and ongoing controversies, setting them concretely among the key economic and political developments of the period. The Malenkov-Khrushchev rivalry is shown to have been more than a struggle for personal power: "At the same time, adversaries in the production-consumption dispute were wedded to rival theories about the style of government. Those of the austerity school obscured the parlous condition of agriculture and were resigned to the managerial devices of authoritarian cen-

tralism. In contrast, the conciliatory group strove to reveal the actual state of affairs in the countryside and promote a measure of local spontaneity."

This is a solidly documented study, rich in insights and interpretations. It convincingly demonstrates that "the issues, attitudes and gambits in Soviet politics are notably predictable." Above all, it takes Soviet politics out of the realm of unnecessary mystery and abstruseness and sets it firmly in an environment in which men and ideas are competing for power and which can be understood through imaginative and diligent examination. A.Z.R.

THE SOVIET YOUTH PROGRAM: REGIMENTATION AND REBELLION. By ALLEN KASSOF (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 206 pages and index, \$5.50.)

As the training ground for future party leaders, the Soviet Communist Youth League (*Komsomol*) is the focus of indoctrination and involvement. Its more than 53 million children are organized for recreation and trained for citizenship. But increasingly, the recreational function is being displaced by ideological training programs and voluntary work.

This study systematically and perceptively treats the "four principal purposes of the youth program—political control, social transformation, psychological reconstruction, and the formalization of youth institutions." Dr. Kassof's contribution stems from his concentration on "the content of the youth program and the techniques through which it is carried out at the level of the rank-and-file membership." He writes lucidly and compactly. His study represents a notable contribution to this important, and hitherto infrequently investigated, area of Soviet society. A.Z.R.

THE CASE OF RICHARD SORGE. By F. W. DEAKIN AND G. R. STORRY. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966. 373 pages, bibliography and index, 35 shillings.)

Richard Sorge will perhaps prove to be the most successful spy of the twentieth century. Born in 1895 of a German father and Russian mother, he grew up in Germany and served in the Kaiser's army in World War I. A military hero, he became disillusioned with the senselessness of war and gravitated in the early 1920's to the German Communist Party. In 1925 he went to Moscow, became a member of the Soviet Communist Party, and soon after embarked on his career as a spy for the Comintern, and thereafter for the Fourth Bureau of Soviet Military Intelligence.

This fascinating account of his work in China and Japan is based "on all available material published on the Japanese side, dealing with the judicial proceedings against Dr. Sorge; on unpublished evidence of the German official enquiry at the time; and on interviews with many important surviving figures in the drama."

Of the many notable achievements of the Sorge spy ring, two stand out: first, "the advance reports from Sorge warning of the German attack on the Soviet Union"; and second, the information sent in late summer and early fall of 1941 that Japan would not attack the U.S.S.R., but would probably move southwards and against the United States.

A masterful piece of research, as well as absorbing history, this account of Richard Sorge will very likely stimulate fresh interpretations of Soviet foreign policy in the period between 1931 and 1941.

A.Z.R.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND ASIA 1917-27: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. By HARISH KAPUR (London: Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1966. 266 pages, bibliography and index, 45 shillings.)

During the past decade Soviet diplomacy has been particularly active among the new nations of Asia and Africa, often with impressive results. Soviet interest in the underdeveloped world is not a new pheno-

menon, a point that is convincingly demonstrated in this scholarly and lucid account of the first decade of Soviet foreign policy toward three of these countries—Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

In several introductory chapters, Professor Kapur traces the general course of Soviet policy in Asia and the Near East in the years immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution and sets the stage for his detailed case studies of the three above-mentioned Islamic states. The result of meticulous research, these case studies provide revealing insights into contemporary Soviet policy objectives. For example, Soviet leaders supported Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later known as Ataturk) as long as the Turkish ruler followed an essentially anti-Western policy; they turned "a blind eye not only to the anti-communist policies of the Turkish leader, but also to his reactionary internal policies." A cardinal principle of Soviet foreign policy was the diminution of Western influence in areas contiguous to the Soviet Union. To this end Moscow was prepared then, and apparently is prepared today, to support any government, irrespective of its political and ideological coloration.

The author notes that Soviet policy in this period sought to strengthen the new nationalist and independent governments in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Ideologically, the detachment of Asian states from European control acted to exacerbate the revolutionary situation in Europe; politically and militarily, "the independence of neighboring Asian states minimized British influence and, thereby the insecurity of the Soviet state, which had so often been threatened during the first few years of Soviet history."

A.Z.R.

MARXISM IN THE MODERN WORLD.
EDITED BY MILORAD M. DRACHKOVITCH.
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.
293 pages and notes, \$5.95.)

The essays collected in this volume are for the most part slightly revised and up-

dated versions of papers prepared for the conference "One Hundred Years of Revolutionary Internationals," held at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University in October, 1964. Eight distinguished contributors analyze the evolution of Marxism in the twentieth century. The essays are thoughtful, incisive and learned, and encompass such themes as "The Impact of Marxism in the Twentieth Century," by Raymond Aron; "Leninism," by Bertram Wolfe; "Khrushchevism," by Merle Fainsod; "Maoism," by Arthur A. Cohen; and "Castroism," by Theodore Draper. Ably edited by Dr. Drachkovitch, the selections are eminently suited for college use, although the addition of an index would make the volume even more useful.

This volume is highly recommended for students of communism and it is to be hoped that an inexpensive paperback edition will soon be forthcoming. A.Z.R.

LENINGRAD 1941: THE BLOCKADE.
BY DMITRI V. PAVLOV. Translated by John C. Adams. (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. 177 pages and index, \$4.50.)

Leningrad 1941 is the story of the nearly incredible efforts to keep the residents of Leningrad alive during the siege by the German armies. The author blends admiration for the heroism of the people, praise for the energy and ingenuity of the governmental and Communist Party leadership (the author, himself, was chief of food supplies) and grim statistics describing the hardships and sufferings of the people—poignantly illustrated by the changes in the formulae of the bread. At the same time, he includes the concurrent errors of officials and criminal activities—forgery of ration cards, black marketing, theft—induced sometimes by greed, sometimes by desperation. His little book will appeal to students of the U.S.S.R., of war, and of humanity.

G. W. Thumm
Bates College

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

C.P.S.U. Statement on China

On August 31, 1966, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) issued a statement accusing China of undercutting the international Communist movement and of aiding the cause of imperialism in Vietnam. The text as released by Tass (official Soviet news agency) follows:

Serious attention has been drawn in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party to the communiqué, published in the Chinese press, of the 11th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist party of China, whose work was under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

As seen from this communiqué the plenary meeting of the Chinese Communist party's Central Committee studied domestic problems and passed a decision on the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution." Along with this the plenary meeting made a number of statements on problems of the international Communist movement and in this connection made slanderous attacks on the Soviet Communist party and the Soviet Union. The decisions of the plenary meeting have officially confirmed the intention of the Chinese party leadership to implement further their own course, opposing it to the Marxist-Leninist line jointly worked out by fraternal parties at the conferences of 1957 and 1960.

The documents of the plenary meeting show that the Chinese party leadership has given the approval of its anti-Soviet line the form of an official policy of the Chinese Communist party. The plenary meeting has in effect rejected the proposal of the Soviet and other fraternal parties on joint action in the struggle against imperialism, including against American imperialism's aggression in Vietnam.

Attention is drawn to the fact that it was precisely after the plenary meeting that the

anti-Soviet campaign, which has been conducted systematically in China for a long time, flared up with new force. It is becoming increasingly more obvious that the leadership of the Chinese People's Republic, using the concoctions about the U.S.S.R.'s "collusion" with United States imperialism and the "restoration of capitalism" in the Soviet Union as a cover, is again provoking a sharp deterioration of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic. Things have gone so far that mass outrages have been organized near the Soviet Embassy in Peking.

The Soviet Communist party's Central Committee believes that such actions and the statement officially made by the leading body of the Chinese Communist party signify a new serious step damaging the cause of the unity of the international Communist movement, the cause of the struggle for socialism, national liberation, for peace and the security of the peoples.

In conditions when imperialism is stepping up its efforts in the struggle against the revolutionary movement, is expanding the dirty war in Vietnam, such a step renders a particularly big service to imperialism and reaction.

Responsibility for the renunciation of joint, coordinated struggle against imperialism and reaction, for the unceasing attempts to split the Communist movement, the socialist community and to weaken the anti-imperialist front rests fully with the leadership of the

Chinese Communist party and the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Communist party's Central Committee has always proceeded and proceeds from the fact that the struggle against

imperialism, against all reactionary forces insistently demands the unity, cohesion and solidarity of all Communist parties, of all so-

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The Soviet Union's Eighth Five-Year Plan

A plenary meeting of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) adopted draft directives for the five-year plan for 1966-1970 in February, 1966, before the meeting of the 23d party congress. The summary published by Tass on February 21, 1966, follows:

The C.P.S.U. regards it as the main economic task of the current Five-Year Plan to insure a further considerable expansion of industry, a fast, stable pace of development of agriculture and, thanks to this, to achieve a substantial rise in the living standards of the people, according to the draft directives of the 23d C.P.S.U. congress for the Five-Year Plan of development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1966-1970.

The draft was adopted at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. that was held here. The regular congress of the Communist party will be opened in Moscow on March 29.

The draft directives point to the need of increasing the national income by 38 to 41 per cent within the five years. Real per capita incomes will grow approximately 30 per cent. Measures are envisaged to narrow down the gap between the living standards of the rural and urban populations.

Industrial output will be increased approximately 50 per cent.

It is planned to envisage in the new five-year plan stepped-up rates of labor productivity growth. Furthermore, the electric-power consumption per worker in industry will increase 50 per cent, and in agriculture approximately 200 per cent.

The Five-Year Plan is to insure the further growth of the Soviet Union's defense capacity.

The draft directives stress the importance of faster scientific and technical progress. A

program for the development of scientific research in various spheres has been envisaged, with priority for theoretical and applied mathematics, nuclear physics and the physics of solid bodies, especially further work on problems of controlled thermonuclear synthesis, exploration of outer space and use of the results for improving radio communications, radio navigations, television and meteorological service.

Concerning the problems of improving economic management, the draft directives recall the decisions of the party envisaging an improvement in planning, economic stimulation of production, wider initiative and economic independence of enterprises, greater material incentive for the workers in the results of their labor.

Setting concrete tasks for industry, the draft directives envisage a 49 to 52 per cent increase in the output of means of production and a 43 to 46 per cent increase in the production of consumer goods.

Labor productivity in industry is to go up 33 to 35 per cent during the five years.

It is planned to give attention to streamlining the structure of industrial production, for which purpose it is envisaged to develop electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemical industry and metallurgy at a faster pace.

Electric-power output in 1970 will reach 840 to 850 billion kilowatt-hours (507 billion in 1965). To be built, in the main, are huge

thermal power plants. Generating capacity will increase during the five-year period by a total of 64 to 66 million kilowatts, i.e., by more than 50 per cent.

Within five years the production of oil must increase to 345 to 355 million tons or exceed the present level by more than 40 per cent. The building of new oil-producing centers in western Siberia and western Kazakhstan is regarded as a paramount task. Production of natural gas is to increase still faster.

In 1970, the Soviet Union will produce 124 to 129 million tons of steel. Emphasis is on improving the quality of the metal.

The production of mineral fertilizers and chemical fibers is to increase approximately 100 per cent, plastics and synthetic resins 170 per cent, and synthetic rubber 120 per cent.

In mechanical engineering the directives provide for a sharp increase in the output of cars—from 616,400 in 1965 to 1,510,000 in 1970. Moreover the production of passenger cars will approximately quadruple. The output of farm machinery and equipment for the metallurgy, power engineering, chemical, coal, oil and gas industries will increase at a fast pace.

The average annual volume of farm production in 1966–1970 is to be increased by 25 per cent as compared with the previous Five-Year Plan period. Average annual grain production, for instance, is to increase by 30 per cent. The main method of expanding production is to be an increase in the harvest yields of farm crops.

Measures are being envisaged to improve agricultural production in the virgin-soil development regions, and an extensive improvement program has been envisaged for many regions of the country.

State capital investments in agriculture during the five year period will approximately double and will amount to 41 billion rubles.

Agriculture will be supplied in 1966–1970 with 1,790,000 tractors, 1,100,000 trucks and 550,000 grain harvestors.

It is envisaged to increase labor productivity growth in agriculture by 40 to 45 per

cent—that is, by a bigger margin than in industry.

The total volume of capital investments in the national economy in the five years will be 310 billion rubles (or 47 per cent more than in 1961–1965), including 152 billion rubles for the development of industry, transport and communications; 71 billion rubles for construction and acquisition of machinery for agriculture, approximately 75 billion rubles for home-building and for municipal, cultural and service facilities.

Emphasis is laid on the necessity of raising the efficiency of capital construction and making it cheaper.

An extensive program for raising the material welfare and cultural standards of the people is envisaged. It is planned to raise the wages of factory and office workers by not less than 20 per cent, and collective farmers' incomes in cash and kind from the commonly owned husbandry on the average by 35 to 40 per cent.

Salaries and wages will be increased primarily for low-paid categories of workers. The role of premiums and lump awards will be raised substantially in labor remuneration. This will combine the interests of every worker more fully with the interests of the personnel of an enterprise and the society as a whole.

It is planned to introduce everywhere a monthly guaranteed remuneration for the work of collective farmers, corresponding to the level of wages for workers of state farms.

In 1970, the national economy will employ 91 to 92 million factory and office workers.

The draft directives envisage a 40 per cent increase in the volume of production of light industry and food industry during the five-year plan period. The output of television sets, for instance, will more than double and that of household refrigerators more than treble.

Per-capita consumption of meat is to increase, on the average, 20 to 25 per cent; milk, 15 to 18 per cent; vegetables, 35 to 40 per cent; fruit and grapes, 45 to 50 per cent; fish, 50 to 60 per cent.

Service facilities will be converted into a

major mechanized branch of the national economy during the five years.

The introduction of universal secondary 10-year education for young people will be completed in the main by 1970. The number of children at state preschool institutions (kindergartens and nurseries) will reach 12.2 million, which is 60 per cent more than now. This means that the requirements of the urban population in child-welfare institutions will be satisfied in the main.

It is planned to train approximately seven million specialists with higher and secondary education during the five years.

The draft directives also envisage special tasks in the development of external economic relations of the U.S.S.R. The structure of Soviet export is to be improved by increasing the deliveries of machinery, equipment, instruments, transport and communications facilities and by expanding international sea, air and other Soviet carriage facilities.

The development of foreign tourism is also envisaged.

It is emphasized that fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan will be of great international importance, will make a contribution to the cause of strengthening universal peace and security.

Fulfillment of the tasks will promote the further establishment, in the practice of international affairs, of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems.

As a result of the fulfillment of the five-year plan, the Soviet Union will "attain new heights in the economic competition with capitalism, and this will exert a great influence on the intensification of the world revolutionary process," the document says.

The implementation of this plan will be "fresh proof of the fulfillment by the Soviet people of their internationalist duty to the fraternal Socialist countries, the international proletariat and the world liberation movement."

The draft directives also sum up the main results of the development of the Soviet national economy in 1959-1965 and point out: "The closing years of the Seven-Year Plan

coincided with an aggravation of international tension, caused by American imperialism's aggression in different areas of the world. This required additional allocations to insure the country's defense capacity.

"The most vital task is not to allow a new world war to break out."

The directives will provide the basis for the drafting of the national economic-development plan of the U.S.S.R. for 1966-1970. The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. will then submit the draft of the new Five-Year Plan to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

U.S.S.R. AND THE WEST

(Continued from page 199)

unist parties notwithstanding. Their voluntary allegiance is suspect.

There is no doubt that in the last year the situation in West Europe has become an opportune one for Soviet expansion of its influence. West Europeans accept the Soviet Union as a status quo power and not as an aggressive threat. They are increasingly hostile about the American commitment to Vietnam and have allowed de Gaulle to destroy Atlantic unity without coming up with any real alternative. Nevertheless, they still hesitate to trust the Communists and their inconsistent goals. At the moment the United States is the prime beneficiary of this contretemps and is only too happy to have the Soviet Union fence-sitting while America is engaged in the Vietnamese war.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY

(Continued from page 225)

which the authors are not responsible) with their estimates, total defense spending is presently between 12 and 15 per cent of gross national product (Western definition); the comparable United States figure is in the vicinity of 10 per cent. These figures suggest a moderately greater relative defense burden on Soviet than on American resources, to be expected in view of the discrepancy be-

tween their GNP's and the pressure on the Russians to keep at least within hailing distance of American defense capabilities.

Second, the composition of defense expenditures. Far different kinds of resources are drawn away from the civilian economy by a large standing army and by advanced missile systems. Recent Soviet (and American) defense policy has emphasized "fire power" over personnel. Added to the space race, this has meant a large commitment of scientists, technicians and specialized production facilities. It is precisely those sorts of resources that could make the difference between success and failure in increasing industrial productivity and efficiency, boosting agricultural output and expanding consumer goods output. Premier Kosygin stressed shortages of various kinds of scientific manpower in his 23d congress report on the new five-year plan.

Third, the burden of defense in the course of time. Generally speaking, the more that is spent on defense now, the lower the rate of growth (and thus the greater the relative burden of defense outlays) in the future; and conversely. This consideration must be uppermost in the minds of Soviet leaders as they ponder the implications of their commitments in Vietnam. A choice between winning the economic growth race against the United States, and retaining the title of champion of world communism, would not be a comfortable one. Peking has not neglected to point out the "uncomradeliness" of the Soviet concern for domestic consumer goods while the North Vietnamese are losing their petroleum storage and loading facilities.

IV

By way of a brief summary, substantial changes seem to be in prospect for the Soviet economy. Seen in perspective, some of the changes—e.g., the "new" agricultural program—are not so substantial as they seem at first glance. It is also possible that the changes in the civilian economy may conflict with Soviet defense and space programs. Which way the conflict will be resolved, if it comes, still remains an open question.

SOVIET SPACE EFFORT

(Continued from page 232)

perfected. Animal experiments were used as a basis for designing facilities for human flight in space.

Man's flight in space is subject to a number of unusual conditions: rapid acceleration and deceleration, excessive vibration and noise, long periods of being in a state of weightlessness, restricted amounts of oxygen, difficulties of feeding and elimination, exposure to cosmic, corpuscular and ultraviolet radiation from the sun, bombardment of the vehicle by meteorites. At the same time, the demands on the astronaut are stringent: he must be alert and efficient under unusual conditions.

The preliminary selection of the astronauts by the Soviet Union is made on the basis of extensive clinical tests and physiological examinations. Astronauts are then subjected to centrifugal machines, vibration stands, periods of observation in chambers of controlled pressure and temperature and confinement in isolation capsules. Special clothing has been designed for both travel in a capsule and for a "walk in space." Methods of feeding the astronauts have been developed. Work is being carried out at present on the effect of flights of long duration on the health of living organisms.

The propaganda value of the Soviet space success has been far-reaching. It showed the world that Soviet society, in spite of its lack of individual and corporate freedom, and in spite of its generally low standard of living, could produce a science and technology that mastered sophisticated techniques. In many phases of space technology, it could surpass the United States. It scored many spectacular "firsts" in space accomplishments. No other country except the United States has been able to meet the challenge flung by the flight of the first Sputnik. At present, the two great world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are running a keen race in the field of space science and technology.

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

(Continued from page 212)

hold principle, eliminate differences, strengthen unity and wage a common struggle against the enemy. . .¹⁶

It would seem, then, that the C.C.P. believes itself to be the ever correct and righteous party of illumination and regards the C.P.S.U. as the party of sin, opposing the theories of communism's founding fathers. It is not difficult to conclude from such judgment that the C.C.P. considers itself the only party worthy of leading world communism and believes Mao should inherit the mantle of Stalin of which Khrushchev was unworthy. The above C.C.P. statement of August, 1966, proclaimed that:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has *inherited*, developed and defended Marxism-Leninism with genius, creatively and in an all-round way, and has raised Marxism-Leninism to a new stage.¹⁷

This is not the first time the C.C.P. has claimed Communist leadership by implication even though it protested that there should be no "patriarchal party" and that all parties, in accordance with the 1957 and 1960 documents, are free and equal.

Such protestations are both right and wrong. The Chinese leaders, up to 1960, promoted the vanguard role of the C.P.S.U. because of its greater experience in "building socialism." There are innumerable statements by Chinese spokesmen to that effect. Obviously, the C.C.P. did not mean to permit a state of dependency upon the C.P.S.U.; it had virtually freed itself from taking the Kremlin's orders after the 1940's. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, in 1955, acknowledged this by stating that China was coequal with the U.S.S.R. Yet there re-

mained a father-son relationship of sorts which Mao almost certainly condoned as long as Stalin was alive. After Stalin's death, and particularly after Khrushchev's break with Stalinism in 1956, this relationship deteriorated to the point where in 1960 the article series "Long Live Leninism!" amounted to a declaration of ideological independence.

The statutes of the Comintern, adopted in 1920, which have never been refuted, state that "the communist international must in fact be a single communist party of the entire world" and that, consequently, the national parties are only branches of the world party. This world party obviously must furnish leadership. During the Comintern era, such leadership was provided by Moscow. Stalin succeeded in fashioning the Comintern as a world-wide instrument of the C.P.S.U. It is hard to say whether this policy hurt the world movement *à la longue*. The U.S.S.R. was the only socialist country then extant, and it supported parties elsewhere, both financially and organizationally. Without Soviet aid, without the presence of a large country under a Bolshevik government, international communism might have remained an insignificant movement or might even have been eradicated. Thus Soviet leadership over the movement experienced a logical growth. After all, the U.S.S.R. was to be the prototype of a Communist world state.

The situation changed, not because of the dissolution of the Comintern and the failure of the Cominform, but because, after World War II, with the rise of satellite states and the unexpectedly quick victory of the Chinese Communists, no adequate organization existed to embrace the new socialist states. The only semblance of an organization was the concept of the *Sodruzhestvo*, the "commonwealth" of socialist states, which lacked the compulsory features of the Comintern. It was conceived as a voluntaristic association of like-minded states, held together by identical beliefs and common hatreds. It was much discussed in the late 1950's but slowly lost its appeal after the Sino-Soviet conflict flared up into the open in 1960.¹⁸

The Stalinist concept of world communism

¹⁶ "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," first *Comment*, September 6, 1963, pp. 51-53.

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, see footnote 15 (emphasis added).

¹⁸ See the writer's "The Communist Commonwealth of Nations," *Orbis*, Winter, 1960.

was monolithic. Once this monolith ceased to exist, the nature of Communist world organization was forced to change, and once the Soviet party ceased to be recognized as leading, there were three possibilities: either a new leading party would be found and enthroned; or two Communist centers would gather their adherents around them, thereby splitting world communism right down the middle; or the movement would no longer be a movement but, rather, a conglomeration of Communist-ruled states and Communist parties outside the orbit. In other words, world communism would still exist but would no longer be purposefully united. It continued to exist, however, thanks to the presence of two great states which ruled over enormous territorial land masses and large populations and without whose powerful support communism probably would have withered away.

The desire to inherit world Communist leadership is not primarily the result of national interests, ethnic differences, predatory demands, or economic ambitions. Nationalism in a country ruled by a Communist party differs from nationalism in a Western sense. The Chinese ploy for Communist leadership is not necessarily (and certainly not exclusively) the result of nationalist ambitions. Rather Peking hopes that the Communist world will accept Peking's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism to the exclusion of any other opinion. There is here a combination of a tremendous ideological ego, and the ancient belief that China is the "center of the world," or the "realm of the middle," which in effect is what the word "China" means. When the Chinese press stated in January, 1960, that "Comrade Mao Tse-tung is . . . the greatest revolutionary leader, statesman and theoretician of Marxism-Leninism in the present era," it clearly implied his ascendancy

over all other leaders, including those of the Kremlin. Thus the struggle for leadership of world communism is a very important ingredient of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

"WARS OF LIBERATION"—VIETNAM

The Chinese insist that wars of liberation are the only means to achieve Communist control over the underdeveloped or noncommitted countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In "Long Live Leninism!" they supported "the revolutionary wars of the oppressed peoples for their own liberation and progress and because all revolutionary wars are just wars." Five years later, the Soviets, in an editorial on Vietnam, declared that

. . . the American imperialists and their apologists are trying to prove the legitimacy of waging wars against people who are standing up for their national independence. But wars of national liberation are just wars. They are a legitimate weapon of oppressed peoples and express their aspiration to live in freedom without foreign oppressors and their henchmen.¹⁹

But while these two statements seem to have much in common, their implementation differs a great deal. Indeed, in their letter of July 14, 1963, the Soviets had already made it clear that they considered it their

. . . duty to tell the party of the people with all frankness that in the question of war and peace the CCP leadership has cardinal, fundamental differences with us. Their essence lies in the diametrically opposed approach to such vital problems as the possibility of averting thermonuclear war, peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the interconnection between the struggle for peace and the developments of the world revolutionary movement.**

They go on to accuse the Chinese of believing that war cannot be ended so long as imperialism exists and that peaceful coexistence is an illusion. They do not believe, as the Chinese do, that "on the ruins of destroyed imperialism a beautiful future will be built." The schism in the thinking about the use of force and national liberation wars was stated with great vigor by Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao when he stated that

. . . in the final analysis the whole course of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of Asian, African, and Latin American

¹⁹ *Pravda*, December 25, 1965.

** The letter of July 14, 1963, addressed by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to the Central Committee of the C.C.P. is one of the most forceful statements of the Soviet position on the issues of war and peace in Communist theory. See *The Polemic of the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 526 ff.

peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. A socialist country should regard it as its internationalist duty to support the peoples' revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.²⁰

One can only conclude that while it is possible to find both Soviet and Chinese quotations supporting national liberation wars, in practice the Soviets appear to be more cautious than the Chinese. This has been clearly shown in the Cuban missile crisis and again in the Vietnamese war. In the latter instance the Chinese went so far as to accuse the Soviet leaders of "cooperating" with the United States. Statements from Peking sounded increasingly belligerent even though there was no indication that Red China would actually intervene in the war on the side of North Vietnam. The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, while denouncing American policy in Vietnam, declining a role as mediator and providing some military aid to North Vietnam, obviously wish to prevent a further deterioration in U.S.S.R.-United States relations.

Consequently, the refusal of the Kremlin to enter the struggle actively by giving much more help to the Ho Chi-minh regime and by causing difficulties for the United States in Europe has led to particularly bitter exchanges between Moscow and Peking. Typical are the remarks of Chinese Vice-Premier Chen Yi on July 10, 1966, in which he accused the Soviets of being responsible for the United States bombings of the suburbs of Hanoi and Haiphong because of their alleged collaboration with the Americans. He also charged that the Soviet Union had been given advance notice of the bombings and went on as follows:

The Soviet leading clique has all along worked hand in glove with U.S. imperialism on the Vietnam question and served Lyndon Johnson's peace talks schemes in the vain hope of bringing the Vietnam question into the orbit of U.S.-Soviet collaboration. It is seeking a détente and a reduction of armed forces in Europe so that the

²⁰ *Renmin Ribao*, September 3, 1965.

²¹ *Peking Review*, No. 29, July 15, 1966, pp. 28-29.

²² *Pravda*, July 15, 1966, and *Izvestia*, July 16, 1966, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 18, No. 28, August 3, 1966, pp. 18-19.

U.S. can draw away forces and use them against the Vietnamese people. It is making military deployments along the Chinese border in coordination with the U.S. imperialist encirclement of China. It is fabricating and spreading rumors and slanders everywhere, accusing China of obstructing the transit of aid material to Vietnam, in an attempt to undermine the unity between the peoples of China and Vietnam and to sabotage the Vietnamese people's war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.²¹

In its denial of Chen Yi's charge, *Tass* in effect put the onus for obstructing the "anti-imperialist" struggle in Vietnam squarely on China:

One might assume that scarcely any person in his right mind would believe this lie. Unfortunately, it was readily caught up in Peking. . . . The impression is created that this lie was manufactured in Washington with the express hope that it would be seized upon by Peking officials with a weakness for anti-Soviet frauds. In uttering new slander against the Soviet Union in unison with the fabrications of American propaganda, Chen Yi is in essence doing a service for the imperialists of the U.S.A., who are waging a piratical war against the Vietnamese people.²²

It is hard to understand why a rational leadership would purposely antagonize a powerful government which presumably shares its political faith. The point is that the Mao regime is no longer rational. Its foreign policies have led to a number of political defeats in Asia and Africa, and even North Vietnam and North Korea, which are contiguous to its borders, appear to have shifted their pro-Chinese stance to a more "neutral" position. This became clear when the North Vietnam Lao Dong (C.P.) participated in the 23d C.P.S.U. congress and when North Korea issued a declaration of party independence — the most outspoken statement of polycentric doctrine yet proclaimed.

CONCLUSION

How long can the Sino-Soviet cold war continue without leading to a severance of relations between the parties and the states? Can the 1950 Mutual Assistance Treaty, signed by Moscow and Peking, still be re-

garded as valid? Are those observers correct who predict that "Sino-Soviet differences have become so great that any permanent reconciliation seems unlikely?"²³

At this point, a word of caution is necessary. Although a sharp and steady deterioration of relations between Moscow and Peking is demonstrable, the conflict should not be regarded exclusively as a quarrel between two nation states but primarily as an exercise in dialectics or, in Mao's terms, "contradictions." Communist states are ruled not by governments but by parties. Decision-making power rests in the party politbureaus, not in the "parliamentary" bodies or government offices. A change of leadership could result in a change of policies or ideological modifications. This is particularly pertinent to the Chinese leadership where changes are bound to occur after Mao's death. A succession in the Kremlin need not necessarily lead to basic policy reversals but, in Peking, Mao's disappearance probably would bring about considerable upheaval and a change of course—if not immediately then a few years later.

The Peking purge of 1966, misnamed by the Chinese as "cultural revolution," apparently had as its goal the perpetuation of a fundamentalist Mao line. There have been repeated indications that Mao is afraid of mellowing tendencies among party cadres, government officials, youth and intellectuals. The present "cultural revolution," which may well be followed by a new "leap forward" to whip the people into line, almost certainly is an attempt to arrest incipient "revisionism." For it is conceivable that a successor generation would look upon Mao's policy towards the U.S.S.R. as unproductive and attempt to work out a rapprochement, however limited. Historical experience shows that extreme fanaticism cannot last, and that eventually rigidity will make room for adjustments. Such changes cannot be ruled out; it is well known how Communists manage public opinion and how they turn on and off the faucets of their propaganda.

For this reason, it is erroneous (and danger-

²³ W. E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965," *The China Quarterly* (January-March, 1966), p. 143.

ous) to assume that the Sino-Soviet conflict is irretrievable. In Communist affairs, more than in ordinary human affairs, nothing is irretrievable. To be sure, the dispute between Moscow and Peking has gone far beyond the expectations of the experts and one must not eliminate the possibility of a permanent break between the two Communist giants. But this is by no means a foregone conclusion. It would be a mistake to formulate policy under the assumption of a permanent schism between Moscow and Peking. At the very least, different contingencies should be considered and more unbiased studies should be undertaken to analyze the possibilities of changes in Communist China after Mao.

The purge in Peking, designed to perpetuate Communist extremism, may well delay the return to reason in China mainland. But once the commanding position of Mao no longer exists, once his prestige becomes theoretical and the party and state apparatus are no longer under his personal influence, a gradual change in the political climate is almost impossible to avoid. Even if men like Lin Piao or Liu Shao-ch'i succeed him—men who are sure to uphold Maoism as long as possible—there are unquestionably those among the leadership who secretly do not agree with Mao but wisely hold their tongues. They do not want to share the fate of Marshal Peng Te-huai, who did not agree and said so. There may well occur purges and counterpurges with the result that eventually the fanatics will have to yield to a more rational regime—without necessarily breaking faith with communism. As a result, some working relations with Moscow and a measure of unity in world communism may then be reestablished. While Mao is still alive, such an improvement obviously is out of the question.

It is interesting to note that the 1950 Moscow-Peking Treaty has not been officially rescinded, although it probably may be considered suspended. Similarly, relations between the parties and the states have not been broken. (It may be remembered that party but not state relations between Yugo-

slavia and the U.S.S.R. were broken in 1948 after Yugoslavia's defection.)

Whatever we hear in the months and years to come about worsening Sino-Soviet relations, we cannot rule out the chance that the conflict may be negotiated eventually and, at least to some extent, more Communist unity of purpose be reestablished some time after Mao's death. It may be a tenuous unity, for the "socialist camp" has become increasingly pluralistic. But mutual beliefs and common hatreds could create a rather strong bond against "imperialism." On the other hand, we cannot discount the possibility that Moscow and Peking may break party and state relations and repudiate the 1950 treaty.*** The consequences of either development are hard to foresee, and it would be premature to consider them beneficial for world peace.

*** See text of Soviet statement, pp. 237 ff.

STATEMENT ON CHINA

(Continued from page 238)

cialist countries, of all detachments of the revolutionary and liberation movement.

Despite the difficulties created by the Chinese party leadership, the Communist party of the Soviet Union will continue to promote further the line of strengthening friendship with Chinese Communists, with the multi-million Chinese people, will resolutely uphold the general line of the world Communist movement, the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

SOVIET POLITICS

(Continued from page 217)

Ander Werth, the well-known journalist, points out that Sinyavsky and Daniel were considered dangerous because they expressed cynicism toward the Soviet system itself. Alarm at spreading cynicism was also reflected in the numerous attacks on the liberal literary journal, *Novy Mir*. Werth feels that these attacks were intended as an attempt to

oust editor Alexandre Tvardovsky, and then reminds us that in Stalin's day the removal of an editor was a much simpler affair.⁷

The basic theme of the 23d congress was stability and caution. Soviet society is in a process of evolution. The leaders are determined to prevent change from going too far too fast. They want to get on with the job of internal development without taking the risks inherent in radical innovations. They are bureaucrats who wish to administer. As N. G. Yegorychev, first secretary of the Moscow party committee, stated,

The most characteristic feature of the style of leadership of the CPSU Central Committee and its Presidium and of the Central Committee Secretariat today is a thoughtful, realistic approach to the solution of important and complex economic and political problems. . . .⁸

But the leaders are faced with a society characterized by cynicism and apathy for which they have no ready remedy. Their bureaucratic style, in fact, is hardly likely to counteract this growing mood. At the same time, they are confronting the growing pluralization of Soviet society, a pluralization which is being reflected in the emergence of interest groups hoping to exert a growing influence over policy through both conflict and cooperation with other groups. It is likely that these groups will not be suppressed unless Stalin's methods are resuscitated. On the other hand, these groups seem more interested in influencing government policy than in seeking governmental power. The most likely development is that the bureaucratic authoritarian dictatorship will accommodate itself to the new social situation. This, of course, does not mean that the Soviet regime will be democratized, but only that interest groups will be permitted to express their needs and wants, which will then be integrated and coordinated through the agency of the party. In time the leadership may discover that the interplay of interest groups can promote rather than endanger domestic stability.

⁷ Alexander Werth, "The 23rd Congress: No More Angry Shouts?" *The Nation*, CCII (May 23, 1966), pp. 621-623.

⁸ *Pravda*, March 31, 1966, p. 2.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of August, 1966, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Asian Development Bank

Aug. 22—The Asian Development Bank comes into formal existence when the 16th nation, Finland, completes the required legal steps. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy.*)

Association for Southeast Asia

Aug. 3—At the opening session of the foreign ministers' meeting of the newly-revived association (Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines), Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman urges the other 2 nations to join with Thailand in working for an all-Asian peace conference on Vietnam.

Aug. 5—The 3 representatives announce plans to study 33 cooperative projects, including an economic development fund.

Aug. 6—Supporting the Khoman proposal, the association invites other Asian nations to join in an appeal to those involved in the Vietnam war to "come to the conference table."

Disarmament

Aug. 2—At the 17-nation Geneva conference, the U.S. asks the Soviet Union to agree to a freeze on existing levels and kinds of nuclear weapons carriers.

Aug. 9—The U.S. suggests that the nuclear powers contract to undertake nuclear blasting for peaceful purposes for countries pledging not to possess nuclear explosives.

Aug. 16—at Geneva, the U.S.S.R. charges that the U.S. is blocking the passage of a treaty to halt proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Aug. 25—The 4-year-old 17-nation Geneva disarmament conference recesses after a seven-month session. It is expected to meet again in mid-January, 1967.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

Aug. 5—The O.A.S. postpones a foreign ministers' conference planned for August 29 in Buenos Aires. The conference was planned before the June 28 coup in Argentina which brought to power a military government not yet recognized by Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Venezuela.

United Nations

Aug. 3—The Security Council refuses to censure Israel for aggression against Syria; however, Israel's July 14 air attack against Syrian engineering works is unanimously "deplored."

Aug. 15—Secretary-General U Thant asks a budget of \$128,227,800 for next year—a 5.5 per cent rise.

Aug. 24—U Thant says he will tell the U.N. by letter September 1 whether he will accept another term as Secretary-General.

Vietnamese War

Aug. 9—It is reported from Saigon that intelligence estimates put the number of Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam at 282,000—11,000 more than the July 1 estimate and 52,000 more than the January 1 estimate.

Aug. 12—Speaking in Manila during a 4-day state visit, South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky backs the appeal for an Asian peace conference on Vietnam which was proposed last week by the Association for Southeast Asia; however, he urges the non-Communist countries to coordinate their policies first.

Aug. 13—On his return to Saigon, Ky alters his previous stand favoring an invasion of North Vietnam and the suggestion that U.S. troops could be withdrawn from Viet-

nam in 2 years. He denies that he ever called for an American withdrawal and states that an invasion of the North would be complicated by nonmilitary factors.

Aug. 14—It is reported from Saigon that on August 12 a misdirected bombing raid struck South Vietnamese civilians.

Aug. 21—It is reported from Saigon that General William Westmoreland has issued an order to "prevent the recurrence" of incidents such as the accidental U.S. strafing of a U.S. Coast Guard cutter on August 11, which killed 2 crew members and wounded 5.

Aug. 22—A report prepared by Indian and Canadian members of the International Control Commission for Laos is published in London; it gives evidence that North Vietnamese troops are operating in Laos, contrary to the 1962 Geneva Agreement.

Aug. 24—In Saigon, General Westmoreland says the infliction of casualties on civilians in Vietnam is a "great problem" that must be overcome; it is revealed by U.S. military sources that since July 1 at least 143 civilians or friendly military personnel have been killed and 234 wounded by allied air and artillery strikes.

Aug. 27—United States officials disclose that a new U.S. peace offer through an unnamed third country was rebuffed by Hanoi.

ARGENTINA

Aug. 3—The editorial staff and the directorate of the University of Buenos Aires Press resign, protesting the regime of Lieutenant General Juan Carlos Onganía. This follows the recent resignation of the rectors and most faculty deans of five major nationally-chartered universities. (See also *Argentina, Current History*, September, 1966, p. 182.)

Aug. 13—The regime pledges that it will establish price controls and study "monopolistic prices and the entire retailing system in Argentina."

Aug. 15—Roman Catholic bishops dissociate themselves from the Onganía regime.

Aug. 16—President Onganía offers to restore most prerogatives of the nationally char-

tered universities, in the first reversal of government policy since the June 28 coup. Aug. 23—The government outlaws the Argentine University Federation and several student organizations, following street demonstrations last evening.

Aug. 28—The regime decrees an emergency law providing for compulsory government arbitration of labor disputes.

BOLIVIA

Aug. 6—Lieutenant General René Barrientos Ortuño is sworn in as constitutional president; Barrientos took power after a coup d'état in November, 1964, and was constitutionally elected president July 3, 1966.

BRAZIL

Aug. 2—The government submits a balanced budget of \$3 billion for 1967 to congress; at the same time President Humberto Castelo Branco imposes a 1-year freeze on wages.

Aug. 7—The Brazilian Democratic Movement, Brazil's only legal opposition party, says it will boycott the presidential elections (October 3) and the gubernatorial elections (September 15), to protest the indirect election system. Opposition candidates will be presented for the direct, popular election (November 15) of federal senators and deputies, state legislators and municipal officers.

Aug. 10—72 bishops of Brazil's northeastern region publish a declaration on "injustice against workers," criticizing the government for not enforcing labor legislation.

Aug. 30—The National Security Council decides to call a special session of congress to vote on the draft of a new constitution rather than to convene a constituent assembly.

BURUNDI

Aug. 30—Foreign Minister Pie Massambuko announces that his country will resume diplomatic relations with Communist China; he also signs a security agreement with the Congo (Kinshasa) and Rwanda.

CAMBODIA

(See also *France*)

Aug. 3—It is reported by the official news

agency that 2 U.S. planes attacked a village in Cambodia yesterday, killing at least 3 and wounding 9 persons.

Aug. 13—Prince Norodom Sihanouk, chief-of-state, cancels plans to meet President Johnson's special envoy, W. Averell Harriman, in September; he finds U.S. regrets over the August 2 bombing raid in Cambodia "very qualified and rather unusual." Sihanouk asks the U.S. for a direct apology. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*, August 12 and 16.)

Aug. 19—Sihanouk says he will receive Harriman only if the U.S. recognizes the Cambodian-Vietnamese border as delineated by Cambodia.

CANADA

Aug. 22—Meeting in Montreal, railway unions representing 115,000 members plan a nationwide railroad strike to start August 26.

Aug. 26—Some 115,000 railroad workers strike; most of the nation is without rail or telegraph service.

Aug. 29—Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson asks an emergency session of parliament to adopt legislation ordering the railway workers back to their jobs immediately. His bill provides an 8 per cent pay increase.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Aug. 1—The Peking radio reveals that at an Army Day reception, Yang Cheng-wu was introduced as acting chief of the general staff. No mention is made of Lo Jui-ching, chief of the general staff, and there is speculation that he has been purged.

In an editorial in *Chieh-fang Chun Pao*, official army journal, Chairman Mao Tse-tung is quoted as ordering greater "integration" between the army and the Chinese people.

Aug. 17—The Peking radio lists Defense Minister Lin Piao after Mao among those present at a mass rally of Chinese leaders, describing him as Mao's "dearest comrade."

Aug. 23—In the fourth day of teen-age demonstrations in Peking for the "cultural revolution," churches are defaced and closed; organized as "red guards for the cultural revolution," teen-agers roam the

streets, demanding that the Chinese abandon bourgeois "Western" tendencies. Anti-Soviet slogans are shouted.

Aug. 28—A Japanese newspaper reports that the Red Guards met their first resistance and injuries in incidents on August 25.

Aug. 29—Thousands of demonstrators protest "revisionism"—the Chinese term for Soviet communism—in an all-day march near the Soviet embassy.

Aug. 31—At a rally, Defense Minister Lin Piao cautions the Red Guards to carry out their campaign against "bourgeois" influences "by reasoning and not by . . . force."

COLOMBIA

Aug. 7—Carlos Lleras Restrepo is sworn in as the 11th president of Colombia.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF (Kinshasa)

Aug. 23—President Joseph D. Mobutu says air and river communication with Kisanganani (Stanleyville) will be reestablished this week; he says the situation in Kisanganani, where Katanganese troops mutinied in July, is improving. (See *Congo, Current History*, Sept., 1966, p. 183.)

CUBA

Aug. 30—In a 5-hour speech to a congress of the Confederation of Cuban Labor, Premier Fidel Castro concedes that his regime is under "tremendous" internal and external economic and political pressure, but he vows to pursue "our own way to communism."

ETHIOPIA

(See *France*)

FRANCE

Aug. 25—President Charles de Gaulle leaves on a 27,000-mile world trip.

Rioting demonstrators ask "total independence" as de Gaulle arrives in French Somaliland.

Aug. 26—De Gaulle is forced to cancel a speaking engagement as rioting continues.

Aug. 29—Ending a 3-day state visit to Ethiopia, de Gaulle and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie issue a joint communique

pledging an entente between the 2 nations for the pursuance of world peace. "Informed sources" report that de Gaulle has offered financial aid to Ethiopia for the construction of a 325-mile interior railway line.

Aug. 30—De Gaulle arrives in Cambodia and is greeted by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian chief-of-state; he states that he and Sihanouk will seek a plan for peace in Asia.

Aug. 31—De Gaulle meets with Nguyen Thuong, chief of North Vietnam's diplomatic mission to Cambodia; no details are disclosed.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Aug. 13—At a celebration marking the 5th year of the Berlin wall, Walter Ulbricht, chairman of the Council of State, claims that the wall has foiled West Germany's plans to topple the East German regime.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Aug. 15—The vice chairman of the Social Democrats (the opposition party), Helmut Schmidt, proposes that Germany recognize Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

Aug. 20—in a newspaper interview, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard states that he will remain chancellor until the election of a new Bundestag in 1969. The Social Democrats have recently demanded that he resign.

Aug. 22—Lieutenant General Werner Panitzki, commanding general of the West German air force, is temporarily relieved of his post; it is revealed that he offered his resignation 10 days ago. Panitzki has demanded a reorganization of the defense ministry, which has been the object of public criticism due to the number of accidents involving the American-designed jet fighter-bomber, the Starfighter.

Aug. 23—Inspector General Heinz Trettner, highest ranking officer in the armed forces, resigns because of a dispute with Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel. His resignation is reported to have no direct connection with Panitzki's suspension.

Aug. 24—Major General Günther Pape resigns as commander of the army's third military district, disagreeing with von Hassel's policies with regard to union activity at military installations.

Aug. 25—Giving von Hassel his support, Erhard accepts the resignations of the 3 resigning generals and appoints new members to the West German high command.

Aug. 27—West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt criticizes the "absence of leadership in Bonn" but rejects any possibility that his Social Democratic Party would join the Christian Democratic Union Party in a coalition.

Aug. 29—In the face of growing criticism, Von Hassel announces that he will retire 6 air force generals in October, 1966, and make other changes in the air force high command in 1967.

GREECE

Aug. 6—Civil servants strike against all state services in Athens, protesting the parliamentary delay of legislation that would establish a uniform pay scale for the country's civil servants.

GUATEMALA

Aug. 4—President César Méndez Montenegro announces that all government- and state bank-owned farms will be turned over to the peasants who work on them.

INDIA

Aug. 4—"Informed sources" say that India is seeking the expansion of the International Control Commission's role in the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam to prevent the further spread of the war into that area.

Aug. 9—The government informs the U.S. that supplying Pakistan with arms presents a grave threat to India.

Aug. 21—The government approves the outline for a \$31.6-billion 5-year economic plan aimed at increasing agricultural production and promoting industrial growth.

INDONESIA

Aug. 11—The anti-Malaysian confrontation officially ends with the signing of a peace accord in Jakarta between the 2 nations.

Aug. 13—Mohammad Dahlan, chairman of the central committee of the Moslem Scholars, the largest political party, opposes action to normalize relations with Malaysia. He calls for elections on national self-determination in East Malaysia, before Malaysia is recognized.

Aug. 19—Foreign Minister Adam Malik declares that his country is firm in its intention to return to the United Nations.

IRAQ

Aug. 6—Premier Abdel Rahman al-Bazzaz and his cabinet resign. President Abdel Rahman Arif accepts the resignation and names Naji Talib (a former minister) as premier.

Aug. 9—A new 18-member cabinet is formed.

Aug. 21—The new government issues a policy statement stressing unity with the United Arab Republic. Talib states that the new regime will uphold al-Bazzaz's plan for settlement of the Kurdish problem.

ISRAEL

Aug. 2—President Zalman Shazar meets with U.S. President Lyndon Johnson for an hour and attends a state dinner at the White House.

Aug. 15—Syrian and Israeli planes and boats clash near the Sea of Galilee.

JAPAN

Aug. 3—Premier Eisaku Sato pledges intensified efforts to stabilize the economy.

Aug. 5—in an attempt to ease a dispute with South Korea, the government announces that it will postpone indefinitely the issuance of entrance visas to 3 North Korean technicians.

Aug. 15—Foreign office sources report that a delegation is going to Mongolia on August 22 to explore the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Aug. 28—Eight legislators leave for Peking to reassess Tokyo's relations with Communist China.

KENYA

Aug. 4—Kenyan police arrest 5 leaders of the opposition Kenya People's Union party,

who are subsequently detained without trial.

KOREA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Aug. 12—The North Korean Communist Party proclaims its independence of Soviet and Chinese control.

MALAYSIA

Aug. 4—The government sends a 3-man delegation to Indonesia to establish a direct link between the 2 governments. (See also *Indonesia*.)

Aug. 5—The government announces that Sabah and Sarawak will be known as East Malaysia, and Malaya as West Malaysia.

Aug. 19—It is officially announced that 2 Malaysian infantry brigades will replace 4 British Commonwealth units when they withdraw from East Malaysia.

MEXICO

Aug. 4—President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz calls for the impeachment of the governor of the state of Durango, Enrique Dupre Ceniceros, due to his "lack of interest, irresponsibility and ineptitude."

NETHERLANDS, THE

Aug. 3—The government refuses to extend the visas of 8 Communist Chinese technicians who are wanted for questioning about the July death of one of their colleagues. (See *Netherlands, Current History*, September, 1966, p. 186.)

Aug. 19—The government asks Peking to release the Dutch charge d'affaires, Geert Jongejons, who has been forceably detained at the Dutch legation in Peking since July 22, in retaliation for Dutch detention of the 8 technicians.

NICARAGUA

Aug. 3—President René Schick Gutiérrez dies following a heart attack he suffered yesterday. Congress elects Lorenzo Guerrero, one of 3 vice-presidents, to complete Schick's term.

NIGERIA

Aug. 1—The chief-of-staff of Nigeria's army, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, an-

nounces himself head of the national military government.

Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, military governor of the predominantly Ibo Eastern Region, protests that only the Hausa army rebels (Northern) and their supporters were consulted on the formation of the new government of Gowon.

Aug. 3—At least 15 army officers of the Eastern Ibo tribe are reported killed by Northern troops.

Aug. 4—Gowon's office releases 15 prominent politicians from both the Eastern and Western Regions, some of whom have been imprisoned since 1963.

Aug. 8—Gowon states that his administration will return the country to the federal system, abolishing the centralized form of government established by Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi.

Aug. 9—Ojukwu states that his region is negotiating with the government, which he claims is dominated by the Hausa tribe from the Northern Region, for the release of all Ibos from the armed forces. He also emphasizes that he (not the Lagos government) controls the Eastern region.

Aug. 10—It is disclosed that the slain bodies of Ironsi and the Western military governor, Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, were found on August 3.

Aug. 13—The exchange of Ibo troops begins.

Aug. 29—Ojukwu decrees an official day of mourning for the East's tribesmen killed in the May riots and the July mutiny; Gowon denounces the action as "unconstitutional."

Aug. 31—The military government publishes a decree formally restoring the federal system of government; the decree takes effect September 1.

PAKISTAN

Aug. 10—Foreign Minister Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada accuses India of expansionist designs.

RHODESIA

Aug. 26—Minister of Law, Justice and Order Desmond Lardner-Burke states that proposed constitutional changes allowing the government to detain subversives have been

designed to end "a constant state of emergency" and restore normality. It is reported that Britain has broken off efforts to negotiate because of these changes. (See also *United Kingdom*.)

SYRIA

(See *Israel*)

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *China, People's Republic of*)

Aug. 2—in accordance with the constitution, Premier Aleksei Kosygin submits the resignation of his government to the first meeting of the new Supreme Soviet (parliament); he is unanimously reelected.

Aug. 3—Kosygin, speaking at the closing session of the Supreme Soviet, discloses that disputes over prices and broad management reform of the economy have caused a delay in the initiation of the new 5-year plan.

Aug. 4—It is announced that the parliament has approved a law which will make foreign visitors who violate travel restrictions in the U.S.S.R. liable to a maximum 1-year prison term.

Aug. 13—The government announces that it is organizing a nationwide farm competition in which bonuses and honors will be offered as incentives to increased agricultural production.

Aug. 20—The Soviet Union for the first time sends weather data (gathered by Cosmos 122) over the weather communication link with the U.S. set up in 1964.

Aug. 21—It is announced that General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev will make a 4-day unofficial visit to Yugoslavia in September.

Aug. 27—It is reported that the government delivered a note to the Chinese embassy yesterday denouncing the recent demonstrations against its embassy in Peking.

Aug. 28—The government discloses that it is training North Vietnamese fighter pilots in the U.S.S.R.

Aug. 29—*Tass* announces that Luna 11, launched last Wednesday, began a moon orbit yesterday. It is reported from England that the unmanned spaceship transmitted pictures for 30 minutes.

Aug. 31—The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (the Communist Party) issues its strongest attack on Communist China's leaders since former Premier Nikita Khrushchev's regime—accusing Peking of undercutting the international Communist movement, thereby aiding the U.S. imperialist effort in Vietnam. (For text, see page 237 of this issue.)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See also *Yemen*)

Aug. 6—The government rejects a British charge that Egyptian planes attacked a village in South Arabia, saying the charges are false and have already been publicly denied.

Aug. 20—Mustafa Amin, the prominent editor of the mass-circulation newspaper *Al Akhbar*, is found guilty by the state security court of spying for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He is sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor.

Aug. 22—The government unexpectedly reverses its policy and decides to permit 2 U.S. sixth fleet destroyers to pay an official visit to Port Said in September.

During a 2-day trial, the state security court convicts and sentences a total of 92 members of the illegal Moslem Brotherhood to prison. More convictions are expected.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Aug. 1—The British Colonial Office is officially closed without ceremony; the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office are merged into the new Commonwealth Office.

Aug. 3—The Conservatives fail to force a floor debate on the government's wage and price freezing bill.

Aug. 8—Home Secretary Roy Jenkins tells the House of Commons that the Labour Party wants to abolish the 7-century-old tradition of unanimous jury verdicts because of "mounting and formidable evidence" of corruption and intimidation of jurors.

Aug. 10—The House of Commons votes 272–214 in favor of the government's drastic wage and price freeze.

Prime Minister Harold Wilson shifts several of his top ministers; among other changes, Minister of Economics George Brown and Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart exchange places.

Aug. 25—Conferences in Rhodesia working to ameliorate the British-Rhodesian disagreement end when 2 British officials beginning a new round of exploratory talks are summoned home by Prime Minister Wilson. (See also *Rhodesia*.)

BRITISH TERRITORIES

South Arabia

Aug. 22—The government closes its border with Yemen, bans trade with that country and threatens to deport 105 Yemenis, in retaliation for the assassination of Ahmed Bassendawah, Aden's representative to the federal parliament.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Aug. 8—Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman announces an 8.9 million-acre increase in the 1967 federal wheat acreage allotment; added to the 7.7 million-acre increase announced in May, this frees 16.6 more acres for wheat planting in 1967 than in 1966.

Aug. 30—The Agriculture Department reports that farm income in August rose to the highest level since the Korean War.

Civil Rights

Aug. 5—For more than five hours, white crowds stage disorders in protest against civil rights marchers protesting segregated housing in a white residential area of Chicago; Martin Luther King is hit by a rock but continues to march.

Aug. 26—King calls off scheduled Chicago-area protest demonstrations when civil rights workers, civic leaders and real estate officials in Chicago reach agreement on a 10-point program to end discrimination in residential real estate.

Aug. 27—Civil rights leaders set a goal of a

minimum 1 per cent Negro occupancy in 75 Chicago-area communities by April 30, 1967.

Several hundred thousand Negro pupils will attend previously all-white public schools Monday in 11 Southern states, according to a U.S. Office of Education report released today.

Aug. 28—Wisconsin national guardsmen protect Negro pickets from jeering white spectators during the 10th night of demonstrations in the Milwaukee suburb of Wauwau-tosa.

The Economy

Aug. 3—Jones and Laughlin Steel and Armco Steel announce a price rise on 3 major steel products of 2.1 per cent, following similar action by Inland Steel yesterday.

Aug. 4—The White House terms the steel price rise "inflationary."

Aug. 16—Major banks announce a rise in prime (minimum) interest charges on short-term business loans from 5.75 to 6 per cent. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler says that the rate increase "threatens to push up the cost of money again for every borrower." This is the 4th rise in 9 months.

Aug. 17—The Federal Reserve Board "freezes" some \$450 million of lendable funds by increasing from 5 to 6 per cent the reserves that banks must maintain against time deposits.

Aug. 18—The President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy urges a more flexible wage-price policy instead of the President's current wage-price guidelines.

Aug. 22—The Department of Labor reports that the July Consumer Price Index reached a record high, making 1966 the most inflationary year since 1957. Since the beginning of 1966, prices have been rising at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl*, *Vietnamese War* and
Cambodia)

Aug. 4—Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary

of State for Inter-American Affairs, makes public a statement expressing "dismay and concern" over the closing of Argentine universities. (See also *Argentina*.)

Aug. 5—Secretary of State Dean Rusk praises Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk for the "constructive and positive job" he has performed in developing Cambodia. Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with the U.S. in May, 1965, because of U.S. involvement on the Indochinese peninsula.

The U.S. refuses to accept a Soviet note protesting alleged U.S. "provocation and criminal actions" against Soviet merchant ships delivering cargoes to North Vietnam.

Aug. 12—in Saigon, a U.S. spokesman says that villages bombed July 31 and August 2 by U.S. planes were in South Vietnam; Cambodia asserts the hamlets were in Cambodia.

Aug. 14—A report published today reveals that on August 2 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told the Senate Appropriations Committee that the U.S. will lose an estimated 580 planes, worth \$1.2 billion, in Vietnam in fiscal 1967.

Visiting President Johnson in Texas, General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, says there are no indications that North Vietnam is slackening its war effort. President Johnson says that "a Communist military takeover of South Vietnam" is now "impossible," but that there will be no quick victory.

Aug. 16—The U.S. and 6 other states complete legal ratification of the charter of the Asian Development Bank. (See also *Intl*, *Asian Development Bank*.)

Reversing its statement of August 12, the U.S. says that the village bombed by U.S. planes August 2 may have been in Cambodia, and apologizes for "any loss of Cambodian life and property."

Aug. 21—President Johnson confers with Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson at Campobello; this is their sixth meeting since Lyndon Johnson became President.

Aug. 22—Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells U.N. Secretary-General U Thant that the

U.S. prefers to deescalate the Vietnamese war but that Hanoi and its allies show no interest in deescalation.

U.S. Representative to the U.N. Arthur Goldberg says that the U.S. "will never agree" to expelling Nationalist China from the U.N.

Aug. 24—President Johnson says he would "be very pleased to see" an all-Asian conference to settle the Vietnamese war; he also reiterates U.S. willingness to participate in a reconvened Geneva conference.

Aug. 31—It is reported that U.S. servicemen and government workers will be confined to quarters during the South Vietnamese election—to avoid any impression of American pressure in the election and as a security measure against possible terrorist attacks.

Government

Aug. 2—President Johnson urges Congress to enact legislation controlling gun sales, in a statement deplored yesterday's mass murder by a deranged student in Texas.

Aug. 4—Secretary of Agriculture Freeman says he has asked the Federal Trade Commission to begin a nationwide inquiry into recent food price increases, with special emphasis on rising bread and milk prices.

Aug. 16—The House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) opens hearings on private American aid to the Vietcong, after a federal court order restraining the committee from starting the hearings is dissolved.

Aug. 19—HUAC ends the investigative stage of its hearings into aid for the Vietcong; during the 4 days of riotous disturbances that marked the HUAC hearings, at least 50 persons were arrested for disorderly conduct. The committee plans to submit legislation making it a felony for Americans to aid persons engaged in hostilities against the U.S.

Aug. 23—President Johnson asks John Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, to institute a "major study" of rising medical costs.

President Johnson signs a bill protecting animals utilized for medical research.

Aug. 27—In an executive order, the government moves to include 95 per cent of the nation's banks under federal fair employment regulations.

Aug. 30—The Senate approves Johnson's nomination of Constance Baker Motley as a U.S. district court judge for southern New York; she is the first Negro woman named to the federal bench.

Labor

Aug. 15—The *New York Herald Tribune* formally discontinues publication; a 114-day strike has prevented the publication of all 3 newspapers planned by the merged publishing enterprise, the World Journal Tribune, Inc. The corporation still plans to publish an afternoon and a Sunday paper.

Aug. 19—After a 43-day strike, members of the machinists' union accept a new 3-year contract with 5 major airlines. The strike has affected 60 per cent of the nation's air passenger volume. The cost of the wage increases and other contract benefits is estimated at about \$86.5 million—an increase in costs for the carriers of about 5 per cent a year in wages and benefits.

Aug. 22—The auto industry turns down the United Auto Workers' request for renegotiation of contracts to give special pay rises to skilled workers.

Aug. 26—An agreement is reached between the World Journal Tribune, Inc. and the pressmen's union to end the 124-day strike; union members must still approve the agreement.

Military

Aug. 4—The Department of Defense issues an October draft call for 46,200—the highest monthly call since the Korean War.

Aug. 18—President Johnson indicates that a "practical system of nonmilitary alternatives to the draft" is being considered.

Aug. 23—Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara says that the Defense Department plans special training programs to rehabilitate for military service some 40,000 draft rejects and rejected volunteers over the next 10 months.

Science and Space

Aug. 14—Lunar Orbiter 1, launched August 10, moves into orbit; it is the first U.S. satellite to orbit the moon.

Aug. 29—Orbiter 1 ends 12 days of moon photography; it will transmit the images back to earth until September 15.

VIETNAM, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See also *Intl, Vietnamese War*)

Aug. 26—It is reported in Moscow that Soviet and North Vietnamese leaders conferred secretly last week at a Black Sea resort.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, Vietnamese War*)

Aug. 6—A communique signed by Thich Thien Hoa, acting chairman of the Secular Affairs Institute of the Unified Buddhist Church, appeals to United Nations Secretary-General U Thant and to the U.N.'s Human Rights Commission, among others, to save the South Vietnamese from alleged religious persecution by the South Vietnamese military junta.

Aug. 13—In Saigon, a freed prisoner charges that 400 soldiers and civilians who are charged with having participated in the May-June Buddhist effort to overthrow the government of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky are imprisoned on an island near Cambodia.

Aug. 16—The Unified Buddhist Church asks its members not to participate in the September 11 election for a national assembly to draft a new constitution.

Aug. 17—The government says that press censorship will be lifted August 26 at the official start of the political campaign for the September 11 elections.

Aug. 24—Ky gives his "word of honor as a soldier" that the coming elections will be honest.

Aug. 26—The election campaign opens.

Aug. 27—The Vietcong stage a second terrorist attack in their drive to impede the

September 11 elections; they are reported to have killed 3 national policemen and wounded 6 persons in an attack yesterday.

Aug. 30—Official sources report that the Vietcong have set a bounty on key U.S. and South Vietnamese civilian and military officials and have dispatched squads to kill them. This is considered part of the continuing Vietcong efforts to disrupt the elections. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

YEMEN

Aug. 13—President Abdullah al-Salal unexpectedly returns after 9 months in Egypt "undergoing medical treatment."

Aug. 15—According to unofficial reports, a majority of the government leadership has been challenging the U.A.R. and the policies of President al-Salal. It is reported that Yemeni troops, under the command of Premier Hassan al-Amri, attempted last Thursday to seize control of the Sana airport and the radio station; both places are now reported under Egyptian control.

Aug. 17—President al-Salal and Premier al Amri, feuding for control of Yemen's government, meet for the first time since al-Salal's return.

YUGOSLAVIA

Aug. 4—The Communist press discloses that charges of graft and corruption in the secret police organization are being investigated.

Aug. 8—Writer Mihajlo Mihajlov is arrested and held on suspicion of "spreading false rumors"; he had planned a meeting to discuss the establishment of an anti-Communist magazine.

Aug. 10—Mihajlov's associates cancel the scheduled meeting after one of the participants, Marijan Batinic, is called in for questioning by the police.

Aug. 11—A spokesman for the public prosecutor's office reports that Mihajlov will be tried by the government.

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